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Introduction 
The hurricane season of 2005 has called into question how our 
nation deals with mega catastrophes. Some risks are too large or un-
predictable to be insurable within the current institutional, financial, 
and regulatory frameworks that govern private insurance markets. 
Mega catastrophes may exceed the ability and capacity of private in-
surance markets to deal effectively with incidents of this magnitude. 
Recent catastrophic homeowner property losses caused by hurri-
canes have shaken the insurance industry. The extent of the financial 
losses is staggering. Hurricanes are recurring phenomena. Because of 
the likelihood of future losses, some insurance companies determined 
that it would be in their corporate best interest to leave the residen-
tial homeowner insurance marketplace in the hurricane prone coastal 
states of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Any large-scale 
withdrawal by major insurance companies would potentially under-
mine the residential homeowner insurance marketplace in those 
states. In response, the various departments of insurance within those 
states prevented large-scale market withdrawals through the post-
hurricane implementation of emergency moratorium statutes and 
regulations. Insurance protectionism, in the form of regulatory with-
drawal moratoriums, in the Gulf states or in other states prone to 
hurricanes can potentially threaten the solvency of insurance compa-
nies that are prohibited from withdrawing from these high-risk mar-
kets. The large catastrophic losses of a Category 4 or Category 5 hur-
ricane can cause the failure of a regional or national insurance 
company. By preventing market withdrawal, these states may poten-
tially jeopardize the continued solvency and viability of regional and 
national insurance companies, which may affect citizens of non-
hurricane-affected states, and their respective state guaranty funds. 
After Hurricane Andrew, for example, almost a dozen insurance com-
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panies became insolvent.1 Insolvency not only results in the unavaila-
bility of insurance for those in the affected hurricane area but can al-
so mean that insureds of those insolvent insurance companies in non-
hurricane-affected states lose their insurance coverage and their re-
spective state-guarantee funds may have to provide coverage for any 
non-hail-related claims. Consequently, imposition of emergency 
moratoriums is not the answer. The authors believe that the resolu-
tion for such catastrophic hurricane losses is a mandatory federal in-
surance program that shifts the costs to those living in hurricane-
prone states throughout the entire region. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the finan-
cial consequences of recent and future hurricane seasons, which may 
require a federal hurricane-insurance program to cover losses in the 
future. 
Part II discusses Hurricane Andrew and the emergence of non-
cancellation moratoriums in the marketplace for residential-
homeowner insurance adopted by the Florida Department of Insur-
ance and the Florida Legislature. To some extent, Florida’s example 
set the groundwork for the emergency moratoriums issued following 
the catastrophic losses from Hurricane Katrina in the states of Ala-
bama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Part II also discusses the Florida 
moratorium regulatory approach to catastrophic hurricane losses. 
Part III introduces the foundation of America’s dual-sovereignty 
system and summarizes the historical battle over jurisdiction to regu-
late the insurance industry. 
Part IV explores possible constitutional challenges to emergency-
hurricane moratoriums. A principle hurdle to constitutionally over-
coming the moratorium regulations is proving that discriminatory de 
facto redlining would not occur from wholesale market withdrawals in 
the Gulf states and other states affected by hurricanes. 
Part V discusses a possible federal solution to state moratorium 
protectionism. Part V-A discussed the possibility of federal legislation 
prohibiting state-imposed moratoriums. Part V-B explains why a fed-
eral catastrophic-insurance program is warranted because of market-
place dysfunction. Part V-C offers the creation of a federal hurricane-
 
 1. Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 Geo. 
L.J. 783, 830 (2005) (noting that nine insurers became insolvent after Hurricane Andrew and 
were allowed to exit the Florida insurance market completely); Mireya Navarro, Storms Expose 
Florida’s Vulnerability, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/13/us/stor 
ms-expose-florida-s-vulnerability.html. 
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insurance program as an alternative solution to emergency moratori-
ums. There is precedent for federal intervention. If the federal gov-
ernment does not enact a federal catastrophic-insurance program, 
then an alternative would be to pass the National Insurance Act al-
lowing for federal chartering of insurance companies. Part V-D dis-
cusses federal charters as an alternative approach. Federally chartered 
insurance companies would not be subject to state regulatory with-
drawal moratorium regulations. A federally chartered insurance com-
pany could withdraw from participating in providing insurance in 
identified hurricane risk areas. 
I. Losses from Previous and Future Hurricane Seasons 
Like floods, the devastation and financial consequences of hurri-
canes are staggering. The federal government through the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)2 provides disaster assis-
tance to individuals, families, and businesses whose property have 
been damaged or destroyed as a result of a flood and whose losses are 
not covered by flood insurance.3 Disaster assistance is available to pay 
for temporary housing, disaster-related medical and dental costs, dis-
aster-related funeral and burial costs, clothing, fuel, moving and stor-
age expenses, and other necessary expenses as determined by FEMA.4 
Most federal disaster assistance “is in the form of loans administered 
by the Small Business Administration.”5 Federal disaster assistance, 
however, is not intended to restore any damaged property to the con-
 
 2. President Jimmy Carter originally created FEMA by executive order in 1979 to cen-
tralize federal emergency functions. See Exec. Order No. 12,127, 3 C.F.R. § 376 (1980). The 
executive order transferred, among other things, the functions from the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development vested in the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development pur-
suant to the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956 § 15(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2414(e) (2012); the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4001–4129; the National Housing Act § 520(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1735d(b); and Title XII of the Na-
tional Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb. On October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush 
signed the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 
(2006) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 701–900), which significantly reorganized FEMA within the 
Department of Homeland Security and provided substantially new authority to remedy gaps 
that became apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. 
 3. What is Disaster Assistance?, fema.gov, http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-assistance 
(last updated July 18, 2012). 
 4. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, fema.gov,  http://www.fema.gov/disaster-
assistance-available-fema (last updated Aug. 10, 2012). 
 5. What is Disaster Assistance?, supra note 3. 
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dition that it was in before the disaster.6 In Fiscal Year 2010, FEMA 
requested an extra $600 million for its Disaster Relief Fund to sup-
port response, recovery, and mitigation efforts for presidentially-
declared major disasters and emergencies.7 In June 2011, the House 
of Representatives approved a bill that contained an extra $1 billion 
for FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund.8 At the time, the Disaster Relief 
Fund was approximately $2.4 billion.9 Although the Disaster Relief 
Fund appears substantial, this amount may be woefully inadequate in 
light of recent hurricane-related natural disasters and predictions that 
natural disasters will increase in the future. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
predicts increased hurricane activity in upcoming years. NOAA’s 
2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook predicts a 35% chance of an 
above-normal season, a 50% chance of a near-normal season, and a 
15% chance of a below-normal season.10 The Atlantic hurricane re-
gion includes the North Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the 
Gulf of Mexico. NOAA’s outlook was based in part upon three cli-
mate factors: (1) the tropical multi-decadal signal, which has contrib-
uted to the high-activity era in the Atlantic basin that began in 1995; 
(2) a continuation of above-average sea-surface temperatures in the 
tropical Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea; and (3) ENSO-neutral 
conditions (absence of El Niño or La Niña),11 with lingering La Niña 
impacts into the summer. NOAA predicted that the conditions ex-
pected in 2011 have historically produced some active Atlantic hurri-
cane seasons and that the 2011 hurricane season could see activity 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency,  Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request 3 (2009), 
http://www.iaem.com/committees/governmentaffairs/documents/FY2010AssociationRolloutSli
des.pdf. 
 8. Brian Naylor, New Storms, Prior Disasters Burden FEMA’s Budget, NPR.org (June 6, 
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/06/136991203/new-storms-prior-disasters-burd 
en-fema-s-budget. 
 9. Id. 
 10. NOAA 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook Update, Climate Prediction Ctr. 
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane.shtml. 
 11. El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr., http://www.ncdc. 
noaa.gov/teleconnections/enso/index.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (“El Niño and the South-
ern Oscillation, also known as ENSO is a periodic fluctuation (i.e., every 2–7 years) in sea sur-
face temperature (El Niño) and the air pressure of the overlying atmosphere (Southern Oscilla-
tion) across the equatorial Pacific Ocean. The presence of an El Niño, or its opposite—La 
Niña—sufficiently modifies the general flow of the atmosphere to affect normal weather condi-
tions in many parts of the world.”). 
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comparable to a number of active seasons since 1995. NOAA esti-
mated a 70% probability for each of the following ranges of activity 
during 2011: (1) twelve to eighteen named storms; (2) six to ten hur-
ricanes; and (3) three to six major hurricanes.12 The official seasonal 
averages are eleven named storms, with six becoming hurricanes, and 
two of those becoming major hurricanes.13 But since 1995, there has 
been a high activity of hurricanes. Hurricane seasons during 1995 
through 2010 have averaged about fifteen named storms, eight hurri-
canes, and four major hurricanes. NOAA has classified eleven of the 
sixteen seasons since 1995 as above normal, with eight being ex-
tremely active. Only five seasons since 1995 have not been above 
normal. These include four El Niño years (1997, 2002, 2006, and 
2009) and the 2007 season. NOAA’s predictions for the 2011 hurri-
cane season are higher than even the average for 1995 through 2010, 
which is considered a high-activity era. In addition, NOAA believed 
that several dynamical-model forecasts of the number and strength of 
tropical cyclones generally predict an above-normal season in 2011 as 
well. 
In fact, there were a total of nineteen named storms during the 
2011 Atlantic hurricane season with seven becoming hurricanes.14 
Two hurricanes, Katia and Ophelia, were Category 4 hurricanes, 
while Hurricane Irene was a Category 3.15 The 2011 hurricane sea-
son was an above-normal season as predicted. Despite the aforemen-
tioned continued concerns, NOAA originally predicted that the 2012 
Atlantic Hurricane season would be an average season.16 NOAA pre-
dicted that there was a 70% chance of nine to fifteen named storms, 
of which four to eight would strengthen to a hurricane and of those, 
one to three would become major hurricanes.17 NOAA later revised 
 
 12. NOAA 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook Update, supra note 10. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 2011 Atlantic Hurricane Season, Nat’l Weather Serv., http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ 
2011atlan.shtml (last modified May 1, 2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. NOAA Predicts a Near-Normal 2012 Atlantic Season, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Admin. (May 24, 2012), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2012/20120524_atlantic_hurr 
icane_season.html. 
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its hurricane outlook for 2012. NOAA’s updated 2012 Atlantic Hur-
ricane Season Outlook indicated an 85% chance of a near- or above-
normal season.18 NOAA also indicated that there was a “50% chance 
of a near-normal season, a 35% chance of an above normal season, 
and only a 15% chance of a below-normal season.”19 NOAA also es-
timated a 70% probability that the entire 2012 Atlantic hurricane 
season would consist of twelve to seventeen named storms, including 
five to eight hurricanes, of which two to three were expected to be-
come major hurricanes, i.e., Category 3, 4, or 5 with wind speeds at 
least 111 m.p.h.20 As of the mid-November 2012, there were nine-
teen named storms, that included ten hurricanes, of which only one 
was a major hurricane.21 The actual hurricanes in the 2012 Atlantic 
hurricane season exceeded NOAA’s predictions, but were not as 
strong as NOAA predicted. 
In the past 32 years, there have been 133 weather-related disas-
ters in the United States where the overall damages or costs reached 
or exceeded $1 billion.22 The total normalized losses for the 133 
events exceed $875 billion.23 The year 2011 represents the highest 
damage cost-to-date in the United States for any year since 1980 
when the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) began tracking 
billion-dollar disasters.24 Furthermore, in 2011 there were at least ten 
$1 billion disasters that occurred in the United States. Hurricane Ire-
ne, which struck August 20–29, 2011, ranked as the third-highest-
ranking $1 billion weather or climate event of the year, with nearly 
$10 billion in damages from wind and flood.25 The economic damag-
es from weather/climate events, including tornadoes, droughts, and 
floods caused by snow melt or rain, in the United States for 2011 ap-
 
 
 18. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season 
Outlook Update, Nat’l Weather Serv. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products 
/outlooks/hurricane.shtml. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,  Monthly Atlantic Tropical Weather Sum-
mary, Nat’l Weather Serv., http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/MIATWSAT.shtml (last modified 
Dec. 1, 2012). 
 22. Billion Dollar U.S. Weather/Climate Disasters, Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr., 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions (last updated Apr. 26, 2012). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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proached nearly $60 billion.26 
Being faced with such devastating major disasters in 2011 and 
2012, and the certain possibility of more hurricanes in the coming 
years, the nation should consider enacting legislation that addresses 
damages resulting from hurricanes and other major weather phe-
nomena like tornadoes. Otherwise, insurance carriers may withdraw 
from writing insurance coverage in areas prone to hurricanes or pre-
miums for homeowners and business multi-peril policies in those ar-
eas may skyrocket to prohibitive levels. Thus, the first issue is wheth-
er the federal government or state governments should enact 
statutory regulations for the coverage of hurricanes, followed by what 
shape that regulation should take. This article next addresses how 
states have tried to tackle such issues by enacting non-cancellations 
moratoriums. 
II. Hurricane Andrew and the Emergence of Non-
Cancellation Moratoriums for Homeowner Coverage 
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused unprecedented physical, eco-
nomic, and social damage.27 It was estimated that the storm caused 
between $16 and $18 billion in property damage28 and destroyed 
more than 60,000 homes, leaving as many as a quarter-million people 
homeless.29 The insurance companies underestimated the potential 
destructive force of hurricanes like Hurricane Andrew.30 The mone-
tary losses from Andrew greatly exceeded the value of collected pre-
miums in Florida.31 Ten of Florida’s insurance companies were essen-
tially bankrupted by Andrew (claims of policyholders exceeded the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Larry Rohter, Supplies Flow in for Stricken Areas, but Delivery Is Slowed by Wreckage, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1992, at B9 (discussing the extent of damages that Hurricane Andrew in-
flicted). 
 28. See Act of June 8, 1993, ch. 93–401, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881 § 1 (finding by the Florida 
Legislature that Hurricane Andrew caused more than $16 billion of insured loss); Thomas S. 
Mulligan, Quake Payout to Be Insurers’ 3rd Highest, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1994, at 1A (noting the 
cost of damage, in dollars, for different natural disasters). 
 29. See Rohter, supra note 27 (discussing the extent of damages that Hurricane Andrew 
inflicted). 
 30. See Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake of Disasters, L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1993, at 
D9 (noting past insurance-company mistakes). 
 31. See Christina Sherry, Florida Homeowners Feel Pinch as Insurance Companies Bail Out, 
Wash. Post, June 13, 1993, at A3 (noting that an estimated $10.8 billion in premiums were 
collected from Florida homeowners, but $18 billion were incurred as losses). 
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capital surplus and reinsurance set aside for the claims).32 Due to the 
realized risk, insurance companies considered retreating from offer-
ing insurance in the coastal regions of hurricane-prone southern 
Florida.33 National carriers wrote 94% of the homeowner’s business 
in Florida at the time Hurricane Andrew hit.34 Allstate announced 
that it would not renew more than 800,000 policies in the area and 
other carriers announced similar plans to non-renew, cancel, and re-
duce the number of new policies written.35 Matters worsened because 
no other carriers were coming forward to issue policies to homeown-
ers abandoned by the fleeing national carriers.36 
In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Department of In-
surance (FDOI) promulgated emergency rules that limited the num-
ber of permissible cancellations or non-renewals of homeowner in-
surance policies in the coastal counties of Dade and Broward.37 The 
FDOI issued Emergency Rule 4ER93–18, imposing a six-month 
moratorium on the non-renewal or cancellation of homeowner’s pol-
icies due to the risk of hurricane loss.38 Ostensibly, the moratorium 
 
 32. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurance Firms Curbing Coverage for Homeowners; Coastal Are-
as Most Affected by Retrenchment, Wash. Post, May 8, 1993, at E1 (detailing the financial ramifi-
cations for insurance companies caused by Hurricane Andrew). As an example, Prudential Prop-
erty & Casualty Corp. had a capital base of $575 million when Andrew struck and eventually 
paid out claims of more than $1.3 billion. See David Satterfield, Prudential Sues to Drop 25,000-
Insurer Challenges State’s Moratorium, Miami Herald, June 30, 1993, at A1. Prudential Property 
& Casualty Corp. was effectively bankrupted by Hurricane Andrew. Were it not for a capital 
infusion of $900 million from its parent corporation, Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 
Prudential Property & Casualty Corp. would have failed, and its policyholders would have been 
left empty-handed to the tune of more than $600 million. See id. 
 33. See Phillip Longmore, The Politics of Wind: How Tallahassee’s $36 Billion Dollar Insur-
ance Scheme Could Blow You Away, Fla. Trend, Sept. 1994, at 30, 36 (discussing causes of insur-
ance companies’ actions). 
 34. Chad Hemenway, Florida Insurance Commissioner During Andrew Remembers the 
Storm—and Assesses Its Game-Changing Impact, Property Casualty 360 (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2012/08/23/pc360-exclusive-florida-insurance-
commissioner-dur. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, Prohibiting De Facto Insurance Redlining: Will Hur-
ricane Katrina Draw a Discriminatory Redline in the Gulf Coast Sands Prohibiting Access to Home 
Ownership?, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 199, 237 n.254 (2008) (listing sources 
in Florida’s administrative register). 
 38. See id. n.255. 
This emergency rule, however, was legally valid for only ninety days. However, the 
Florida Legislature enacted Ch[apter] 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially im-
posed a six-month moratorium upon the cancellation or non-renewal of homeown-
er’s insurance policies based on the risk of hurricane claims. The preamble to 
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was FDOI’s attempt to temporarily stabilize the residential home-
owner’s insurance marketplace in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. 
The emergency regulation issued by the FDOI was codified by the 
Florida Legislature.39 The legislatively enacted moratorium law con-
tained a provision that addressed potential insurance company insol-
vency.40 Under this provision, if the insurance company could affirm-
atively demonstrate that any proposed cancellation or non-renewal 
was necessary to avoid the risk of that insolvency it would avoid the 
cancellation and nonrenewal regulations.41 In reaching a determina-
tion that the insurance company was facing an unreasonable risk of 
insolvency, the FDOI considered the insurer’s size, its market con-
centration, its general financial condition, the degree to which per-
sonal lines residential property insurance comprised its insurance 
business within the state of Florida, and the way in which those fac-
tors impact on the risk of the insurer’s insolvency in relationship to 
its probable maximum loss in the event of a hurricane.42 An insurance 
company, however, was not required to risk more than its total sur-
plus to an objectively defined maximum loss resulting from one Flor-
ida hurricane loss event.43 
Additionally, the moratorium law had a restricted business phase-
out provision.44 Under the phase-out provision, an insurance compa-
 
Ch[apter] 93-401, Laws of Florida, provides as its justification that “the enormous 
monetary impact to insurers of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to 
propose substantial cancellation or non-renewal of their homeowner’s [policies].” In 
November 1993, when the initial moratorium was scheduled to expire, the Florida 
Legislature met in a special session and approved a three-year extension, and subse-
quent phase out of the moratorium. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 39. See id. at 237–38 n.256 (“Ch. 93-401, Section 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881. The Florida 
legislature enacted Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially imposed a six-month 
moratorium upon the cancellation or non-renewal of homeowner’s insurance policies based on 
the risk of hurricane claims.”). 
 40. 1993 Fla. Laws 2882. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id; see also Fla. Stat. § 627.7013 (repealed 2002); 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531 
(1994). The exception to the phase-out statute has been narrowed by the FDOI’s liberal inter-
pretation of the statute so that any reason given by an insurance company for canceling or non-
renewing a particular homeowner’s policy is deemed to be related to the risk of hurricane loss. 
As an example, in Proposed Rules 4–141.020(9)(a) and 4–141.021(3)(a)(3), the FDOI asserted 
that the statutory word “unrelated” must be construed in a “liberal, wide-reaching manner.” 
Consequently, to be exempted from the phase-out statute’s moratorium limits, a nonrenewal of 
a residential policy “must be completely unrelated, directly or indirectly, to reduction of risk of 
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ny was prohibited from cancelling or non-renewing more than five 
percent of its homeowners’ policies, mobile home owners’ policies or 
personal lines residential policies within the state in any twelve 
month period, and could not cancel or non-renew more than ten per-
cent of its homeowners’ policies, mobile home owners’ policies or 
personal lines residential policies within a given county, to reduce the 
insurer’s exposure to hurricane claims.45 Any insurance company 
seeking to exceed these limits on cancellation or non-renewals within 
a given year was required to file a phase-out plan with the FDOI and 
obtain the FDOI’s approval before implementing the plan.46 At least 
one insurer, Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. of Indi-
ana, sought administrative exemption from the moratorium law 
which was denied by the FDOI and which was unsuccessfully ap-
pealed in court.47 
Florida’s moratorium legislation had an adverse market conse-
quence. 
As of spring 2006, most Florida insurers had stopped writing home-
owners coverage, leaving property owners without preexisting cov-
erage with the prospect of purchasing much more expensive cover-
age through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, the state-
created insurer of last resort, which is now the state’s second largest 
insurer. At the end of the 2005 hurricane season, however, Citizens 
had accumulated a $1.7 billion deficit requiring Florida lawmakers 
to fashion a relief package for the troubled insurer.48  
The Florida Legislature did provide relief to bolster the property 
insurance market including $715 million of general state revenues to 
 
loss from hurricane exposure.” Id. 
 45. Fla. Stat. § 627.7013 (repealed 2002). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Prudential v. Dep’t of Ins., 626 So.2d 994, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“We 
conclude that, by virtue of section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes, rule 9.030(b)(1)(C), Florida Rule 
of Appellate Procedure, and Article V, section 4(b)(2), of the Florida Constitution, we have ju-
risdiction to review the department’s decision in its August 10 letter denying the requested ex-
emption.”). Florida had a withdrawal statute before Hurricane Andrew that authorized insur-
ance companies to surrender their Certificates of Authority thereby withdrawing from the state 
or to withdraw from a specific line of insurance upon giving proper notice. Fla. Stat. 
§ 624.430 (2004). The FDOI construed the phase-out statute as superseding an insurance com-
pany’s right to surrender its Certificate of Authority and withdraw its business from the state’s 
residential property insurance market. See 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531, 534 (1994) (discussing 
the interpretation of § 627.7013). 
 48. Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of Insurance: Federalism 
in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 835, 876 (2006). 
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deal with a portion of Citizens’ deficit.49 Florida policyholders faced 
steep rate hikes50 based upon insurance carriers’ expectations that 
higher reserves were needed to pay claims due to anticipated in-
creased hurricane activity in the area.51 
The Florida Legislature also created the Florida Hurricane Ca-
tastrophe Trust Fund (FHCTF).52 The FHCTF is required to “re-
imburse the insurer for 45%, 75%, or 90% of its losses from each 
covered event in excess of the insurer’s retention, plus 5% of the re-
imbursed losses to cover loss adjustment expenses.”53 Following the 
overwhelming demand on the FHCTF in 2004 and 2005, Florida re-
vamped its state catastrophic reinsurance program.54 Florida House 
Bill 1A, which became law on January 25, 2007, allowed a temporary 
opportunity for insurers to increase their premiums for and coverage 
by the FHCTF.55 The Florida Legislature intended “to create a tem-
porary emergency program, applicable to the 2007, 2008, and 2009 
hurricane seasons, to address these market disruptions and enable in-
surers, at their option, to procure additional coverage from the 
[FHCTF].”56 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. In states vulnerable to hurricanes, rate increases between 30% and 150% have 
been sought. Id. The Mississippi Windstorm Association, insuring Mississippi’s hurricane vul-
nerable coastal areas, was facing a reinsurance rate increase for 2006 of 488%. Id. 
 51. Shaheen Pasha, More Hurricanes, Higher Insurance Rates?, CNN Money (Sept. 23, 
2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/23/news/economy/rita_katrina_insurance/index.htm. 
 52. See Fla. Stat. § 215.555 (2012). The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Trust Fund was 
established by Ch. 93–430, which was codified in section 215.555. See id. 
 53. Id. § 215.555(4)(b). The FHCTF is capitalized by a mandatory assessment against all 
insurers. Id. § 215.555(6)(b). 
 54. Id. § 215.555. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. The Florida Legislature also considered novel incentive programs. The Florida 
Legislature adopted a notion of a Hurricane Savings Account for individuals. See Patrick E. To-
lan, Jr., Facts and Insurance Consequences of Major Disasters: Weathering the Storm, 31 Nova L. Rev. 
487, 521 (2007). The Hurricane Savings Account would be available “to cover an insurance de-
ductible or other uninsured portion of the risks of loss from a hurricane, rising flood waters, or 
other catastrophic wind storm event.” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 222.22(4)(a)). The benefits of 
such an account cannot be realized until the federal government creates a tax-exempt or tax-
deferred savings vehicle. See Fla. Stat. § 222.22(4)(c). The federal government has not yet cre-
ated such a favored tax position. Tolan, supra, at 521. In 2007, the Florida Legislature passed a 
House Memorial asking for the creation of a tax-exempt account for taxpayers to accumulate 
financial reserves on a tax advantage basis for the purpose of paying for mitigation enhance-
ments and catastrophic losses. See Florida H.M. 11A at 3 (2007). The Florida Legislature also 
requested that Congress create a tax-deferred insurance company catastrophe reserve to benefit 
policyholders. See id.; see H.R. 4836, 109th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2006), cited in Tolan, supra, at 521. 
“These tax-deferred reserves would build up over time and only be eligible to be used to pay for 
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Other states followed Florida’s lead. After Hurricane Katrina, the 
Louisiana Department of Insurance issued emergency rules preclud-
ing insurance companies from cancelling or non-renewing policies 
solely because the insured submitted a claim as a result of storm dam-
age from Hurricane Katrina.57 The states of Mississippi58 and Ala-
bama59 also enacted moratoriums on cancellations and non-renewals. 
The non-cancellation and non-renewal moratoriums utilized by Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were less comprehensive than the 
moratorium initiated by the FDOI. What has emerged is the use of 
emergency moratoriums to regulate the post-hurricane residential 
homeowner insurance marketplace. 
III. States Have Authority to Regulate Under Dual 
 
future catastrophic losses.” Florida H.M. 11A at 3 (2007). 
 57. See Emergency Rules 15–17, La. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 2700 et seq. (2005) (man-
dating compliance with state-imposed procedures to ensure coverage in the wake of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita). On September 19, 2005, Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco signed an 
executive order giving the Commissioner of Insurance the temporary authority to implement 
certain emergency insurance rules in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. Exec. 
Order No. KBB 2005–40, § 4. The Commissioner issued Emergency Rules 15, 16, and 17, that 
included, among other things, that an insurance carrier cannot cancel or non-renew policies for 
certain affected parishes because of a Hurricane Katrina claim. Louisiana also adopted Emer-
gency Rule 23, which suspended the rights of any admitted insurer or surplus line insurer to 
cancel or non-renew any personal residential, commercial residential, or commercial property 
insurance policy that sustained damage as a result of Hurricanes Katrina or Rita until sixty days 
after substantial completion of the repair and/or reconstruction of the property or December 
11, 2006. Id. 
 58. Beginning on September 15, 2005, the Mississippi Insurance Department (“MID”), 
for example, imposed a moratorium on cancellations because of the failure to pay premiums 
during the sixty days following August 29, 2005. Bulletin 2005–7. The moratorium was extend-
ed for an additional sixty days on October 26, 2005. Bulletin 2005–12. The MID issued a di-
rective on November 4, 2005 limiting cancellations to property damaged by Hurricane Katrina 
for which repairs have not yet been completed. The directive precluded insurers from canceling 
or refusing to renew a “personal or commercial residential property policy” covering a dwelling 
or residential property in Mississippi that has been damaged by Katrina for a period of sixty 
days after the property has been repaired. Bulletin 2005–13. Bulletin 2005–13 was amended on 
January 27, 2006 to include cancellations/non-renewals of commercial property. 
 59. Even before Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 28, 2005, Alabama had in 
place a policy prohibiting cancellations and non-renewals of automobile or property insurance 
policies based solely on claims arising from a catastrophe, natural disaster, act of nature, or 
weather related cause. Ala. Dep’t of Ins., Bull, Prohibited Policy Cancellation and 
Nonrenewals (July 20, 2004). More recently, the Alabama Department of Insurance issued a 
bulletin on January 3, 2007 requiring written notice to the Commissioner and to the insured of 
non-renewal of coverage based upon the insurer’s desire to reduce its exposure to potential cat-
astrophic events, including but not limited to a hurricane. An insurer’s failure to comply with 
either bulletin is considered an unfair trade practice. Ala. Dep’t of Ins., Bull, Notice Re-
quirements for Non-Renewal of Coverage (Jan. 3, 2007). 
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Sovereignty 
A. Dual Sovereignty Generally 
The United States governmental structure is built upon the con-
cept of dual sovereignty.60 The federal government concurrently 
holds sovereignty concurrent with state governments. The only limi-
tation imposed on this shared sovereignty emanates from the Su-
premacy Clause of the United States Constitution.61 
 
 60. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). See Michael W. McConnell, Federal-
ism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987) (discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system); Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3–10 
(1988) (“A dual system of government checks abuses of power in any branch of the system.”). 
 61. U.S. Const. art VI, para. 2; see also P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (stating that the cen-
tral purpose of the sovereign immunity doctrine is to accord the states the respect owed to them 
as “joint sovereigns”). 
Generally, dual sovereignty is recognized by the federal courts through the Federal Ab-
stention Doctrine. There are many types of abstention. Although many concepts can be labeled 
as part of the Abstention Doctrine, there are four principal variants of the Abstention Doctrine. 
Each of the variants takes on its namesake from the case adopting that particularized abstention 
principle. 
Pullman Abstention applies “when a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unset-
tled question of state law, the federal court should stay its hand in order to provide the state 
courts an opportunity to settle the underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility 
of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.” Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris Cnty Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); 
see also R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)). 
Under Burford Abstention, the federal court considers the independence of state gov-
ernments in carrying out domestic policy, and seeks to avoid conflict between state and federal 
courts. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–34 (1943); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727–28 (1996). 
Under Younger Abstention, “a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecu-
tion begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except in very unusual situations, where 
necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury.” Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971). 
See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976). In Colorado River, the Court tied the variations on ab-
stention (Pullman, Burford, and Younger) together under the broader category of “exceptional 
circumstances.” Id. at 813–17. The Court found that there are “exceptional circumstances” re-
lating to “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and 
comprehensive disposition of litigation,” and that the exceptional circumstances should be 
weighed against the duty to exercise federal jurisdiction. Id. at 817–19 (quoting in part Kerotest 
Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). 
There is a separate line of abstention cases that has developed which define the bounda-
ries of discretion in the context of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. In Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942), the Court gave direction to the lower courts 
regarding their exercise of discretion to deny jurisdiction in federal declaratory judgment ac-
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The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to delineate the scope of 
sovereign immunity reserved by the states. Under the Eleventh 
Amendment non-consenting states may not be sued by private indi-
viduals in federal court.62 States had inherent sovereignty prior to the 
ratification of the United States Constitution. When the Constitution 
was ratified they maintained partial sovereignty which was reserved 
through the Tenth Amendment. The concept of inherent sovereignty 
does not apply to the federal government, however.63 The federal 
government is a sovereign of delegated, limited, and enumerated 
powers.64 The powers of Congress are not given by the people of a 
single state; they are given by the people of the United States to a 
government whose laws, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are 
declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state 
cannot confer a sovereignty, which will extend over them.65 
Under the original Articles of Confederation, Congress could on-
ly legislate with the approval of the states.66 Because of the inadequa-
cy of the federal government to directly legislate, the Constitutional 
Convention was convened.67 Through the ratification process of the 
Constitution, states retained their sovereign immunity.68 A principal 
focus of the Constitutional Convention was to restructure Congress 
in order to give Congress the power to legislate without the need of 
the state legislatures. 
As part of this dual system, “States possess sovereignty concur-
rently with . . . the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause” of the United States Constitu-
 
tions. The Brillhart court found that it would “ordinarily . . . be uneconomical as well as vexa-
tious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending 
in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same par-
ties.” Id. at 491. The Brillhart court advised that district courts should assess whether the con-
troversy could better be resolved in the state court proceeding in determining whether to ab-
stain. Id. 
 62. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
 63. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 335 (1935). 
 64. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883). 
 65. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 69–70 (1907). 
 66. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (“Congress could not direct-
ly tax or legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit ‘legislative’ or ‘governmental’ power to 
make binding ‘law’ enforceable as such.” (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-
ism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1447 (1987))). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755–56 (1999). 
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tion.69 When the states ratified the Constitution, the states retained 
their sovereign authority.70 
B. The Battle for Jurisdiction over the Insurance Industry 
Under dual sovereignty, a question arose over which sovereign, 
the states or the federal government, should regulate the business of 
insurance. The insurance industry wanted loose federal regulation to 
control insurance companies.71 States saw the ability to regulate the 
business of insurance as a significant revenue source.72 As a result, 
there had been a historical tension between the insurance industry 
and state regulators.73 
One of the most significant challenges to state regulation was 
through the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
This challenge sought to replace state regulation with a less rigorous 
federal regulatory scheme.74 But the commerce clause was found to 
be inapplicable by the Supreme Court in Paul v. Virginia75 when the 
Court found that the business of insurance was not conducted in in-
terstate commerce. The ruling in Paul v. Virginia did not dissuade the 
insurance industry. The insurance industry continued in its attempts 
to invalidate state insurance laws through the portal of the commerce 
clause following the Paul decision. Numerous Commerce Clause 
challenges were brought before the United States Supreme Court be-
tween 1869 and 1927 where state law regulation was upheld.76 
 
 69. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
 70. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755–56. 
 71. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625, 631 (1999). 
 72. Id. at 633. 
 73. Id. at 626 (discussing the inherent tension between state and federal regulation and 
the arguments supporting both). 
 74. Davis J. Howard, Uncle Sam v. The Insurance Commissioners: A Multi-Level Approach to 
Defining the “Business of Insurance” Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 25 Willamette L. Rev. 1, 
22 (1989). 
 75. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1869). See also Peter H. Nehemkis, Jr., Paul v. Virginia, 27 Ga. L.J. 
518, 525–26 (1939). 
 76. See Bothwell v. Buckbee-Mears, 275 U.S. 274 (1927) (holding that it was appropriate 
to deny foreign insurer access to state court where foreign insurer was not qualified to transact 
business in the state court); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918) (uphold-
ing state statute taxing gross income of insurance companies); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge 
Cnty., 231 U.S. 495 (1913) (upholding state statute taxing foreign insurers doing business in the 
state on the difference between premiums received and losses and ordinary expenses related to 
business transacted within state); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553 (1902) (upholding 
state statute prohibiting the soliciting of insurance business within the state on behalf of unli-
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Congress had previously enacted sweeping antitrust legislation 
through the Clayton Act,77 the Sherman Act,78 and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.79 Following the Paul decision, a debate then arose 
as to whether federal antitrust law or weak state insurance laws 
should govern monopolistic behavior within the insurance industry. 
The expansion of federal antitrust law and federal regulations over 
interstate commerce resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n80 where the court 
held that “[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its 
activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause. We cannot 
make an exception of the business of insurance.”81 Prior to the South-
Eastern Underwriters decision, the “regulation of insurance transac-
tions was thought to rest exclusively with the States,”82 and “the 
States enjoyed a virtually exclusive domain over the insurance indus-
try.”83 
C. State Jurisdiction Prevails 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act84 was enacted as a direct response 
 
censed foreign insurer); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900) (upholding state 
statute protecting life insurance companies from forfeiture for failure to pay premiums applied 
to foreign insurer which issued a policy to state resident); Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367 
(1896) (upholding statute holding agents of unlicensed foreign insurers personally liable on pol-
icies sold); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (upholding statute requiring agent of for-
eign insurer to post a bond); Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886) (upholding 
New York retaliatory tax on foreign insurance company); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 
77 U.S. 566 (1870) (upholding state tax on insurance companies incorporated abroad); Ducat v. 
Chicago, 77 U.S. 410 (1870) (upholding municipal tax on insurance premiums earned by for-
eign insurance companies). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
 78. Id. §§ 1–11. 
 79. Id. §§ 41–58. 
 80. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 81. Id. at 553. See also Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946); and First Nat’l Bene-
fit Soc’y v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff’d per curiam without opinion 155 F.2d 
522 (9th Cir. 1946), which were decided after South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n but before the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act took effect. Both Garrison and Robertson conformed with Justice 
Black’s statement in South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n that unless Congress preempted the states 
from legislating in the same area, state power over the insurance industry would not be circum-
scribed. 
 82. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969). 
 83. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978). 
 84. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)). 
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to the South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n decision.85 Through the Act, 
Congress declared “that the continued regulation and taxation by the 
several states of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and 
that silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose 
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the sev-
eral states.”86 Congress also confirmed that “[n]o act of Congress 
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted 
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance.”87 The purpose of the congressional enactment was “to restore 
the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation,”88 
and “remove all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the 
States to regulate and tax the business of insurance.”89 
The constitutionality of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was re-
 
 85. Immediately following the South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n decision, there were 
three sessions of Congress considering legislation to reverse the decision before the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was adopted. See An Act to Express the Intent of the Congress with Reference to 
the Regulation of the Business of Insurance, ch. 20, 59 stat. 33 (1945). 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 1011. The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been viewed by some courts and 
commentators as the codification of the state action doctrine within the area of insurance. See 
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Forrest, 839 
F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1988); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return 
to Differential Economic Federalism, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 227 (1987). The state-action doctrine was 
used by insurance companies when McCarran’s antitrust exemption was narrowed by the 
courts. See Robert W. Hammesfahr, Antitrust Exemptions Applicable to the Business of Insurance 
Other than the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The State Action Exemption and the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine, 54 Antitrust L.J. 1321 (1985). More recently the state-action doctrine has been cir-
cumscribed. See Leslie W. Jacobs, State Regulation and the Antitrust Laws, 25 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 221, 231–49 (1975). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 88. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. NA v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996) (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993)). For example, in the Congressional record 
Senator Revercomb states “the very purpose of [the Act] is to restore the control of the insur-
ance business to the States.” 91 Cong. Rec. 462, 485 (1945). Senator Revercomb also stated 
“we want the business left in the control of the States, unless by enactment in the future we spe-
cifically state that we do not want something they are doing to be continued.” Id. Senator El-
lender stated: “I think all of us agree that the States should retain the right of regulating and 
taxing the insurance business within their respective borders.” Id. at 487. Congressman Gwynn 
described the purpose of the Act as follows: “[w]hat we are trying to do is to make it clear to the 
States and to the insurance companies that we are as far as possible removing ourselves from 
the field.” 91 Cong. Rec. 1081, 1090 (1945). Congressman Gwynn emphasized that “in this Bill 
we are making it clear that we do not move into the field [of insurance regulation].” Id. at 1091. 
Congressman Springer observed that the Act was “preserving to the several States their rights 
to control and regulate the insurance business within such states . . . all without [Federal] Gov-
ernmental interference.” Id. at 1092. 
 89. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981). 
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solved in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin90 where the Supreme 
Court held that states could constitutionally regulate interstate insur-
ance transactions provided that there did not exist contradictory fed-
eral legislation related to the business of insurance.91 In order to bar 
the application of federal law (excluding federal anti-trust law), three 
conditions must be present: (1) the federal statute at issue must be a 
“general” statute that does not “specifically relat[e] to the business of 
insurance”92; (2) the state statute at issue must be “enacted for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance”93; and (3) the appli-
cation of the federal statute must “invalidate, impair, or supersede” 
the state statute.94 The court further explained these requirements: 
“The process of deciding what is and is not the ‘business of insur-
ance’ is inherently a case-by-case problem.”95 In order to determine 
whether a state statute regulates the “business of insurance,” courts 
must analyze the purpose of the state statute.96 In making this deter-
mination, courts focus on “the relationship between the insurance 
company and the policyholder.”97 State laws that protect or regulate 
 
 90. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
 91. Id. at 430–31. 
 92. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 501. 
 93. Id. at 508. 
 94. Id. at 500. Before Fabe, some courts had used a four-part test. See, e.g., Cochran v. Pa-
co, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 1979). The fourth part of the test focused on whether the 
alleged activities were within the business of insurance. 
Several courts of appeal have applied federal laws to the business of insurance where the 
application of federal law to a particular insurance transaction is not in “direct conflict” with 
applicable state insurance statutes. Under the “direct conflict” test, the application of general 
federal laws to “the business of insurance” is permitted when state and federal laws do not con-
flict. The “direct conflict” test was first enunciated in NAACP v. American Family Mutual In-
surance Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992). The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits have followed 
the American Family Mutual analysis. See Sabo v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 185, 194 (3d. 
Cir. 1998); Forsythe v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997); Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 
75 F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 1996); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 
1486 (9th Cir. 1995). The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have rejected the direct-conflict test. See 
Ambrose v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 95 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’g 891 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. 
Va. 1995); Kenty v. Bank One, 92 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit uses a degree-
of-impairment analysis. See Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn. NA, 107 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Murff v. Prof’l Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 95. Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 252 (1979) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); see also Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 416–17 n.15 (1946) (adopting a broad def-
inition of “business of insurance” by concluding that the “business of insurance” included every-
thing from the issuance of an insurance policy to the payment of an insurance claim). 
 96. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). 
 97. Id. 
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the insurer-insured relationship regulate the “business of insur-
ance.”98 But a distinction must be drawn between the business of in-
surance and the business of insurance companies.99 
In Group Life & Health Insurance Co., Inc. v. Royal Drug Co. the 
Court created a tripartite test for whether a particular transaction fell 
within the parameters of the “business of insurance.”100 In order to 
be in the “business of insurance,” the transaction must involve the 
transfer, spreading, and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk;101 the 
transaction must directly involve the relationship between the policy-
holder and the insurance company;102 and the transaction must in-
volve only parties who are part of the insurance industry.103 But the 
three criteria set forth in Royal Drug Co. are not necessarily determi-
native.104 Each transaction must be analyzed with respect to all three 
criteria in order to conclude whether it falls within the “business of 
insurance.”105 The “business of insurance” is not solely restricted to 
the writing of insurance contracts.106 Instead, the analysis focuses on 
the performance of the insurance policy.107 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. at 459–60 (“Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to para-
mount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the ‘business of insurance’ does the 
statute apply.”). In Royal Drug Co., the Supreme Court explained the distinction between a so-
called first-clause McCarran-Ferguson case and a so-called second-clause McCarran-Ferguson 
case. Congress intended the first clause of § 2(b) of the Act to further its primary purpose: pre-
serving state regulation of insurance companies. 440 U.S. at 218 n.18 (“There is no question 
that the primary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to preserve state regulation of the 
activities of insurance companies.”). The second clause of § 2(b) addressed Congress’ secondary 
goal: granting insurance companies a limited exception from antitrust laws. Id. (“The question 
in the present case, however, is one under the quite different secondary purpose of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act—to give insurance companies only a limited exemption from the antitrust 
laws.”). Commentators have observed that the Act may create a two-tiered definitional ap-
proach to the phrase “business of insurance.” See, e.g., Robert P. Rothman, Note, The Definition 
of “Business Of Insurance” Under The McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Globe, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 
1475 (1980). But see Justice Kennedy’s dissent in U.S. Department of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 
U.S. 491, 515 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), where he noted that the maxim of statutory con-
struction that “identical words used in different parts of the Act are intended to have the same 
meaning” prevents different meanings of the phrase “business of insurance” throughout 15 
U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 100. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 211–16, 231–33. 
 101. Id. at 211. 
 102. See id. at 211–15. 
 103. Id. at 211. 
 104. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). 
 105. Id. 
 106. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 503 (1993). 
 107. Id. at 503–04. The Royal Drug Co. criteria necessarily include policy performance. Id. 
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Consequently, state jurisdiction over insurance regulation pre-
vails. Nevertheless, Congress can still enact federal legislation that 
specifically applies to the “business of insurance.” In keeping with the 
states’ jurisdiction over insurance regulation, individual states enacted 
myriad legislation to address perceived state-specific issues.108 As dis-
cussed in the next section, in the 1990s, some states tackled the insur-
ance issues resulting from the devastating effects of Hurricane An-
drew and other hurricanes by enacting non-cancellation 
moratoriums. 
IV. Possible Constitutional Challenges to State-
Imposed Hurricane-Emergency Moratoriums 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states have the authority to 
adopt emergency moratoriums. Insurance companies seeking to 
withdraw, in whole or in part, from a state that had enacted a morato-
rium may seek to do so by challenging whether the moratorium is 
constitutionally permissible. If constitutional challenges are success-
ful, then insureds in hurricane-prone states may be faced without 
fewer insurance carriers willing to provide insurance or carriers that 
will do so only at significantly higher and possibly prohibitive rates. 
A constitutional challenge to state moratorium statutes must be 
filed within that state’s court system. It is well established that a 
“State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by [its] own cit-
izens as well as by citizens of another State.”109 The Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides states sover-
eign immunity from suit in federal court. This immunity extends to 
state agencies and other governmental entities that are characterized 
 
at 504. The Court observed: 
Without performance of the terms of the insurance policy, there is no risk transfer at 
all. Moreover, performance of an insurance contract also satisfies the remaining 
prongs of the Pireno test: It is central to the policy relationship between insurer and 
insured and is confined entirely to entities within the insurance industry. 
Id. The dissent, however, viewed the majority’s focus on the performance of the insurance con-
tract as being too broad, because any law that affects policyholder benefits would necessarily be 
a law enacted to regulate the business of insurance. Id. at 511 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 108. See, e.g., Charles R. McGuire, Regulation of the Insurance Industry After Hartford Fire 
Insurance v. California: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
303, 304–05 (1994). 
 109. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 72–73 (2000). 
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as “arms of the state.”110 The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to 
clarify the scope of a state’s sovereign immunity as not authorizing 
suits against states.111 “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh 
Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private 
individuals in federal court.”112 
One of the fundamental understandings behind diversity of citi-
zenship jurisdiction in federal court is that citizens foreign to a par-
ticular state may encounter judicial bias in that state’s court system. 
Removal to federal court can be an important mechanism in preserv-
ing fairness against actualized state oriented bias. Unless a state 
agrees to be sued in federal court by waiving Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, any insurance company challenge to state moratorium 
statutes will need to be brought within that state’s court system. In-
surance companies will likely face judicial bias in favor of state se-
quester.113 This bias will be further incentivized in states where judg-
es are elected.114 
A. Takings Clause Challenges 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant 
part: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”115 “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that pri-
 
 110. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 846 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The 
School District is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
 111. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722–23 (1999). 
 112. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
 113. Cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) 
(“One of the chief purposes of creating the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was to afford 
suitors an unclouded opportunity to assert their rights in the federal courts when the exigencies 
of state court jurisdiction of subject matter or parties, or both together . . . render doubtful their 
ability to proceed in the state courts.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Billy Corriher, Big 
Business Taking over State Supreme Courts: How Campaign Contributions to Judges Tip the Scales 
Against Individuals, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2012/08/13/11974/big-business-
taking-over-state-supreme-courts/. 
 115. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause has been applied to physical invasions of 
property. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (noting that the Takings 
Clause requires compensation for “regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a phys-
ical ‘invasion’ of his property”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 434, 436 (1982) (“When ‘the character of the governmental action’ is a permanent physical 
occupation of property, our cases have uniformly found a taking to the extent of the occupa-
tion,” and “[s]uch an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of 
property.” (citations omitted)). Certain types of invasions of private property have been deemed 
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vate property shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar [the] Government from forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”116 The Fifth Amendment 
applies to state governmental action through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.117 An insurance contract can constitute property subject 
to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.118 
Insurance companies may have constitutional challenges to the 
moratorium statutes or regulations enacted by the Gulf states in the 
aftermath of hurricanes as being “facially”119 unconstitutional or un-
constitutional “as applied.”120 Central to this argument is the asser-
tion that the insurance company will sustain substantial financial loss 
as a result of any prohibition on withdrawal from the Gulf states. In-
 
to be a “per se taking” without regard to the state’s interest in possessing or otherwise using the 
property itself. See, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 95 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 
1996) (“In addition to physical invasions of property, the Supreme Court has also accorded ‘cat-
egorical [per se] treatment,’ invariably requiring compensation, to cases ‘where regulation de-
nies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.’” (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015)). 
For example, when any statute effectuates an actual government takeover of a private insurance 
company, a per-se taking can occur. Id.; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The 
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). Regulations that disregard or destroy an insur-
ance company’s right to cancel an insurance contract do not automatically transform that regu-
lation into a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (holding that the fact that legislation disregards or de-
stroys existing contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal tak-
ing). The factors that must be considered in determining whether a regulatory taking exists are: 
(1) the economic impact that the challenged rule, regulation, or statute has on the insurer; (2) 
the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the 
nature of the challenged action. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
123–25 (1978) (determining whether government conduct constitutes a taking requires that the 
court engage in an ad hoc, factual inquiry); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (“These ‘ad hoc, factual inquiries’ must be conducted with re-
spect to specific property, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valua-
tion relevant in the unique circumstances.”); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259–61 
(1980) (discussing whether zoning ordinances on their face violated the Takings Clause). 
 116. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 117. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121–23 (holding that the Takings Clause also 
applies to the states). 
 118. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (valid contracts are property). 
 119. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (entertaining a 
landowner’s facial challenge to a local redevelopment plan); see also Anderson v. Edwards, 514 
U.S. 143 (1995) (entertaining a facial challenge to a state regulation restructuring the disbursal 
of welfare benefits). 
 120. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127 (discussing whether any restriction im-
posed on individual landmarks pursuant to the regulation is a taking). 
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surance companies can also argue that any statutory or regulatory 
scheme which precludes an insurance company from allocating the 
company’s resources as it sees fit, forcing it to suffer net economic 
losses both within and outside the Gulf states, results in a taking of its 
“property” without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. In order to make this argument work, the insurance 
company must show that it was denied all beneficial use of “proper-
ty.”121Any showing that beneficial use has been denied will fail be-
cause any “compelled” insurance contract would still belong to the 
insurer and policyholders would still pay the insurance company all 
required premiums. 
This argument takes on more significance where the basis for the 
policy cancellation is the failure to pay premiums. As an example, the 
Mississippi Insurance Department, in its emergency regulations, im-
posed a moratorium on cancellations because of the failure to pay 
premiums during the sixty days following Hurricane Katrina.122 This 
moratorium on cancellations for failure to pay premiums was extend-
ed an additional sixty days.123 
The insurance company will need to establish specific economic 
losses in the hurricane-affected markets as a result of any imposed 
state moratorium. This would require the insurance company to pro-
vide evidence that its rates of return in the hurricane-affected market 
since the moratorium was imposed have resulted in an unreasonable 
return. The insurance company could argue that its applications for 
rate increases have been denied (assuming there is evidence of that 
fact) and that any potential for future rate increases would not allevi-
ate the insurance company’s ongoing economic loss. 
Another challenge to the moratorium legislation would be to ar-
gue that the moratorium statute interferes with the insurance compa-
ny’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. Interference with 
investment-backed expectations occurs when an earlier regulation 
does not provide companies with sufficient notice that they may be 
subject to new or additional regulation.124 Where the statutory or 
regulatory scheme has previously been amended, however, courts 
have found that a company is on notice that the legislation may be 
amended in the future and that there will be additional financial obli-
 
 121. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 122. Bulletin 2005–7, supra note 58. 
 123. Bulletin 2005–12, supra note 58. 
 124. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226–28 (1986). 
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gations.125 
The compulsory nature of the moratoriums alone is insufficient 
to establish a Taking Clause violation because all government regula-
tion is compulsory by nature.126 The critical factor in determining 
whether a violative “taking” has occurred is the nature of the state’s 
interest.127 It is less likely that a violative “taking” has occurred when 
the legislation in question serves important public interests.128 The 
 
 125. See id. at 227 (“Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the leg-
islative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” (quot-
ing Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958))). Because the Florida mora-
torium requires insurers to continue doing business in the market, there may be additional 
opportunity to argue a Takings Clause violation. This type of argument is supported by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). In Yee, mobile home 
park owners filed suit against a municipality alleging that a local rent control ordinance 
amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment and therefore entitled the mobile home 
owners to just compensation. The court rejected this argument finding that the municipal ordi-
nance did not compel landlords to rent their mobile homes; instead, landlords were free to evict 
their tenants. Id. at 527–28. The Supreme Court noted, however, that “[a] different case would 
be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to compel a landowner over objection to 
rent his property or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.” Id. at 528; see also Peo-
ple ex rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (“[T]his 
law expressly requires that . . . insurance companies, like the defendants, renew automobile in-
surance policies and, accordingly, it warrants careful review.”). “While [a state’s] police power 
may limit and restrict the uses to which an owner may put his property, it may not compel him 
to use such property for a particular purpose if he prefers to abandon such a use thereof.” Dep’t 
of Pub. Works v. City of San Diego, 10 P.2d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932). Moratoriums inter-
fere with the investment-backed expectations of insurance companies because they compel 
them to continue business in a market against their wishes. See Lewis, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 830–31 
(finding that insurers could not be denied permission to give up writing all of their lines of in-
surance after sustaining continuing losses writing automobile insurance); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. 
R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920) (“A carrier cannot be compelled to carry on even 
a branch of business at a loss, much less the whole business of carriage.”). This argument may 
fail if the state can show that the insurance company is a provider of a vital public service. A 
state may constitutionally require, however, that a provider of a vital public service provide that 
service to a part of its market even though it is not profitable for the business. See Cont’l Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1245, 1251–52 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that an airline may be com-
pelled to operate one small route at a loss for a limited period of time); Sheeran v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1979) (sustaining the constitutionality of legislation that 
compelled automobile insurers to renew policies because the statute reflected “a clear legislative 
intent that companies which choose to write automobile policies in this state maintain their fair 
share of coverage.”). 
 126. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. (“[I]t cannot be said that the Taking Clause is violated 
whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (stat-
ing that governmental action is less likely to be perceived as a taking when the government acts 
within the public’s interest). 
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general regulation of insurance is within state police powers.129 Mor-
atoriums like that imposed after Hurricane Andrew appear to have 
been intended to stabilize the homeowner marketplace, which would 
fall within the state’s police power.130 Within the framework of those 
powers a state may enact a moratorium for the specific purposes of 
preventing insurance redlining in the hurricane-affected areas. Clear-
ly, an important public interest mandated by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the prevention of discrimination. 
Insurers who withdraw from a state or who have refused to issue 
insurance in specific hurricane-prone areas of the state have been ac-
cused of engaging in redlining.131 States have enacted moratoriums, 
in part, because of concerns of redlining.132 Redlining133 and other 
 
 129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2012) (“The business of insurance, and every person engaged 
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business.”); Cal. State Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 109–10 (1951) 
(stating that the legislature’s broad discretion in adopting police power regulations to promote 
the public welfare “is peculiarly apt when the business of insurance is involved—a business to 
which the government has long had a ‘special relation.’”); Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
404 A.2d 625, 630-31 (N.J. 1979) (“It is well established that the insurance business is strongly 
affected with a public interest and therefore properly subject to comprehensive regulation in 
protecting the public welfare.”). One leading treatise has described the state’s power as follows: 
A state has the unquestioned power to regulate insurance companies and the method 
of conducting that kind of business. The business of insurance is considered not to be 
merely a private right, but a matter of public concern—a franchise subject to regula-
tion by the state for the public good. And in such regulation, the legislatures are con-
sidered to have large powers and wide discretion. 
19 John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 10321 (1982). 
 130. See Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Florida, 141 F.3d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting a 
moratorium imposed after Hurricane Andrew was within the state’s police power). 
 131. See, e.g., Florida Says Prudential Unit Redlines, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1992, at D4. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Redlining is a discriminatory practice that prohibits certain individuals from acquir-
ing property. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 
328–29 (7th Cir. 2004) (defining “redlining” as the practice of denying the extension of credit to 
specific geographic areas based upon the income, race, or ethnicity of its residents); Honorable 
v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Redlining is the prac-
tice of denying the extension of credit to specific geographic areas due to the income, race, or 
ethnicity of its residents.”). In its traditional sense, redlining has been described as “credit dis-
crimination based on the characteristics of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower’s 
dwelling.” Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979). 
“A neighborhood becomes redlined when a lending institution presumes the area is no longer 
economically stable because of age, racial composition or other characteristics.” Edward W. 
Larkin, Note, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 83, 
83–84 (1977). Redlining can have a devastating effect because the presumption becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. See David I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 5–6 (1981) (describing the “cycle of disinvestment” that occurred 
in urban areas as a result of suburban out-migration). Insurance redlining impairs the ability of 
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similar discriminatory practices are restricted by state insurance stat-
utes which regulate differences in rates,134 premiums,135 coverage,136 
services or benefits under the policy,137 rejection of an application for 
a policy,138 refusal to issue or renew a policy,139 and so forth. Addi-
tionally, state statutes may prohibit discrimination based on various 
classifications including race, color, creed, marital status, sex and na-
tional origin.140 Thus, the state may have a rational basis supporting 
its regulatory action.141 
 
individuals of a protected class to acquire property because procuring insurance is a prerequisite 
to obtaining a mortgage. See, e.g., Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate 
Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1993, 1995 (2006) (“The unavailability of 
homeowners insurance in black neighborhoods contributes to the gap in homeownership 
rates.”). 
Insurance redlining is the “outright refusal of an insurance company . . . to provide ser-
vices solely on the basis of a property’s geographical location.” Badain, supra, at 4. Where mi-
norities are denied access to a voluntary market, many individuals in the inner city or demo-
graphic target are treated as second-class consumers who pay more for less insurance coverage 
than their suburban non-target counterparts. See Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (discussing a similar argument made by the 
Department of Housing of Urban Development in 1978). The effect of insurance redlining is 
that investment in redlined areas is limited or stopped. The lack of investment results in a di-
minished growth, repair and sale of housing due to a lack of funding. This is commonly called 
disinvestment. See Marianne M. Jennings, Preemption and State Anti-Redlining Regulations: The 
Need for Clarification, 11 Fordham Urb. L.J. 225, 227 n.6 (1983) (explaining the distinction 
between redlining and disinvestment). The unavailability of property insurance effectively pre-
cludes maintenance and improvement of property. Redlining of a neighborhood or geograph-
ical area almost guarantees that there will be resulting economic decline. Redlining and disin-
vestment spread ghettos. See Badain, supra, at 34–37 (advocating solutions to counter the effects 
of insurance redlining). Badain lays the blame for the decline of in-city neighborhoods in part at 
the feet of insurance companies. Id. at 36. 
 134. See Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10140–10145.4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 38a-488 (West 2012); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 120 (West 2011); N.Y. 
Ins. Law § 2606(a)(1) (McKinney 2008); Or. Rev. Stat. § 737.310 ( 2011). 
 135. See Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10140–10145.4; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-488 ; Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 120; N.Y. Ins. Law § 2606(a)(1); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-55-50 
(2007). 
 136. See, e.g., Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10140–10145.4. 
 137. See, e.g., id. 
 138. See id.; N.Y. Ins. Law § 2606(b)(1). 
 139. See Cal. Ins. Code §§ 675–679.7; N.Y. Ins. Law § 2606(b)(2). 
 140. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20–1548(B) (West 2008); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-3510(a) 
(West 2007) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.2027 (West 2012). 
 141. Some commentators believe that “[t]he unavailability of insurance coverage stem-
ming from redlining has contributed to the deterioration of American urban centers and has 
effectively frustrated attempts at urban revitalization.” Kevin J. Byrne, Comment, Application of 
Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 472, 472 (1981). See also Audrey G. McFar-
lane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 295, 
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The racial demographics of coastal Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana raise a concern of redlining. Generally, minorities had 
higher levels of property damage from Hurricane Katrina in Ala-
bama, Mississippi, and Louisiana compared to whites largely because 
of segregated housing in older and more poorly constructed 
homes.142 It has also been observed that black families were less likely 
to have purchased insurance to cover property damage and tempo-
rary living expenses resulting from a disaster like Hurricane Katri-
na.143 The specific demographics in Florida affected by Hurricane 
Andrew are a mixture of socio-economic strata and any potential de 
facto redlining is less clear.144 
 
352 (1999) (asserting that insurance redlining contributes to the marginalization of inner-
cities); David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the 
Legal Challenge of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 427, 494 (2000) 
(identifying limited access to affordable insurance as a barrier to economic growth); David Dan-
te Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets, Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 
16 (2000) (stating that lack of access to insurance both creates and perpetuates ghetto neigh-
borhoods). 
 142. See The Impact of Certain Governmental Contractor Liability Proposals on Environmental 
Laws: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Superfund and Waste Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Env’t & 
Pub. Works, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center 
for Environmental Justice, Xavier University) (noting differences in property damage because 
of housing demographics). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Traditionally, insurance companies have used objective, reliable criteria regarding 
risk as part of their underwriting process and do not use racially discriminatory factors. See 
Ruthann DeWolfe, Gregory Squires & Alan DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Red-
lining, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 315, 316–17 (1980) (asserting insurance companies’ claims in defense 
of redlining). But see William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: The Inadequacy of Fed-
eral Remedies and the Future of the Property Insurance War, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 735, 737 (1998) (dis-
cussing how insurance companies utilize underwriting practices to redline). Risk discrimination 
is not race discrimination. Identifying and accepting “good” risks while excluding or limiting 
“bad” risks is a fundamental part of the insurance underwriting process. See generally Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1985) (dis-
cussing the mathematically modeled demographic risk factors based upon actual loss criteria 
methods insurers use to classify potential insureds and the possibilities for discrimination). Cat-
astrophic losses occurring from natural disasters which are potentially recurring threaten the 
solvency of insurance companies if they are required to stay on the “bad” risk. See Albert B. 
Crenshaw, Insurance Firms Curbing Coverage for Homeowners; Coastal Areas Most Affected by Re-
trenchment, Wash. Post, May 8, 1993, at E01 (reporting that several insurance companies es-
caped permanent insolvency because of large capital infusions from their parent corporations). 
As an example, Prudential Property & Casualty Corporation had a capital base of $575 million 
when Andrew struck and eventually paid out claims of more than $1.3 billion. See David Satter-
field, Prudential Sues to Drop 25,000-Insurer Challenges State’s Moratorium, Miami Herald, 
June 30, 1993, at A1. The losses from Andrew effectively bankrupted Prudential Property & 
Casualty Corp. Were it not for a capital infusion of $900 million from its parent corporation, 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Prudential Property & Casualty would have failed 
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In the traditional sense, redlining focuses upon idiosyncratic fac-
tors related to a specific minority characteristic or status.145 But al-
leged de facto redlining occurring within the Gulf states does not in-
volve idiosyncratic racial stereotyping because hurricane losses are 
non-discriminatory. The risk of catastrophic loss due to hurricane ac-
tivity has no racial implication. Additionally, the geographic boundary 
involved, i.e., a particular state’s entire shoreline, is too broad a geo-
graphical area to claim that redlining has occurred. Because the ex-
posed area is large, the numbers may not support de facto discrimina-
tion. 
Regarding the stabilization of the homeowners market, insurance 
companies may develop plans to reduce their exposure to loss in the 
damage-prone areas. Legitimately, such plans may be necessary to 
 
and its policyholders would have been left empty-handed to the tune of more than $600 mil-
lion. Id. 
The process is inherently “unfair” because underwriting factors reflect generalizations 
and may not be based upon true statistical evidence of risk. However, an insurance company’s 
legitimate differentiation among risks may produce classifications which effectively discriminate 
on the basis of race or some other protected class status. A plaintiff, for example, can make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act either on a theory of disparate 
impact or disparate treatment. See Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch 
Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466 (3d Cir. 2002); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304–05 
(9th Cir. 1997). A facially neutral practice may violate civil rights laws if it has a “significantly 
discriminatory” impact upon minorities or perpetuates discrimination. Cf. Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645–46 (1989) (analyzing disparate impact claim under Title VII); 
Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, 
Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). At least one commentator has asserted that race 
is the true factor that insurance companies use to deny insurance coverage or to set rates and 
terms. See Robert Yaspan, Note, Property Insurance in the American Ghetto: A Study in Social Irre-
sponsibility, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 218, 233, 236 (1971) (alleging the insurance industry’s effective 
segregation of ghetto areas). 
 145. As an example, insurance companies did not want to underwrite homeowners’ poli-
cies in riot-affected areas in the 1960s. See Badain, supra note 133, at 1. As a result of the riots 
and civil disturbances of the 1960s, the National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected 
Areas was established. Id. at 2. The panel examined the causes and effects of inner-city insur-
ance on availability. See President’s Nat’l Advisory Panel on Ins. in Riot-Affected Are-
as, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities 1–29 (1968) [hereinafter Nat’l Advisory 
Panel]. The panel documented “[w]idespread refusals to insure . . . even where there had been 
no riots and where none were threatened. These were based primarily upon neighborhood 
characteristics, most significantly racial composition, without regard to the merits of the partic-
ular risk.” Badain, supra note 133, at 6. The panel concluded that the main cause of insurance 
unavailability was the fear of catastrophic losses due to rioting. Nat’l Advisory Panel, supra 
2–7. As a result, the panel proposed that the federal government should offer non-cancellable 
low-cost riot insurance. Id. at 7–8. When an insurance company decides not to underwrite risk 
in blighted urban areas because of high crime rates or fear of property damage as a result of 
rioting, the de facto redlining that may occur from such a decision can be attributed to an erro-
neous racial characteristic—i.e., propensity to commit crimes and riotous discourse. 
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protect remaining policyholders who would otherwise be left without 
coverage if a company became insolvent due to another catastrophic 
hurricane. These types of risk plans may include significant cancella-
tions and non-renewals of existing homeowner policies. 
Because of the unique low socio-economic demographics of the 
Gulf states, allowing insurance companies to withdraw from the 
coastal homeowner marketplaces raises the significant concern of de 
facto redlining. The question of insurance redlining may become 
mixed if the coastal counties contain a mixture of different socio-
economic demographics. The greater the mix of socio-economic stra-
ta affected by an insurance company’s withdrawal the greater the 
likelihood of establishing that de facto redlining is not occurring. An 
interesting question would be presented by an insurance company 
that wrote only high-end valued residential properties. If the program 
book of business contains only large valued residential properties, 
then the question of redlining may not be significant. Stabilization of 
the homeowner marketplace should take into consideration specific 
underwriting qualifications and limitations on acceptable risk. For 
those insurance companies that reach a high-end niche marketplace, 
the need to stabilize the overall marketplace may not be significantly 
impacted by a withdrawal from the marketplace of the high-end writ-
er. 
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B. Due Process Clause Challenges146 
A state’s authority to regulate the business of insurance has been 
upheld as constitutional under the Due Process Clause.147 In order to 
prevail under the Due Process Clause,148 the insurance company 
would need to establish that the applicable moratorium legislation 
was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
 
 146. There is significant due process case law involving the method of establishing and 
reviewing insurance rates; however, the case law does not address moratoriums. See 20th Centu-
ry Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566 (Cal. 1994); Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 
1987); Fla. Welding & Erection Serv., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 285 So.2d 386 (Fla. 
1973); Caldwell v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 218 S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 1975); Louisville Auto Club v. Dep’t 
of Ins., 384 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1964); Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., 481 
A.2d 775 (Me. 1984); Katz v. Ins. Comm’r, 454 A.2d 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Auto. In-
surers Bureau of Mass. v. Comm’r of Ins., 718 N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1999); Liab. Investigative 
Fund Effort, Inc. v. Mass. Med. Prof’l Ins. Ass’n, 636 N.E.2d 1317 (Mass. 1994); Shavers v. Kel-
ley, 267 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 1978); Appeal of Nationwide Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1980); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991); Home Indem. Co. v. Arapa-
hoe Drilling Co., 848 P.2d 1131 (N.M. App. 1993); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 303 S.E.2d 
649 (N.C. App. 1983); In re Investigation of Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 609 
N.E.2d 156 (Ohio 1993); Blue Cross of Ne. Ohio v. Ratchford, 416 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1980); 
Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Ins. Dep’t., 641 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Liberty Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 597 A.2d 235 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Ins., 595 A.2d 649 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Ins. Dep’t of Commonwealth of Pa., 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Geeslin v. State 
Farm Lloyd’s, 255 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App. 2008); In re Vt. Health Serv. Corp., 586 A.2d 1145 
(Vt. 1990); Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Rogan, 91 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1958). 
 147. See Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1951) 
(determining that the diminution in value of the insurer’s business due to governmental regula-
tion was not a taking of property without due process of law); id. at 110 n.2 (citing numerous 
cases in which the Court has upheld insurance regulations against Due Process challenges). 
 148. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to contract is a liberty interest guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 566–67 (1911). For 
a discussion of the scope of constitutional liberty interests, see Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of 
Liberty, 61 SMU L. Rev. 1557 (2008). When a state attempts to limit contractual rights, the 
Due Process Clause “provides heightened protection against government interference with cer-
tain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing 
Washington v. Glucksburg 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)). See also Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327, 
331 (1986) (stating that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects individ-
uals from “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to im-
plement them.”). Notwithstanding the liberty interest and the right to contract, the Supreme 
Court has observed that “neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute.” Nebbia v. 
People, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (footnotes omitted); see also Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 
160, 165 (1895) (“It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals 
from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts.”). Thus the state can legisla-
tively supervise contracts through reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the inter-
ests of the community. See McGuire, 219 U.S. at 567. 
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tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”149 This 
rational basis review is highly-deferential to state regulatory deci-
sions.150 As long as there is any conceivable justification for enacting 
the legislation, the rational basis review will find that the state action 
is constitutional.151 Where a state has enacted moratorium legislation 
in order to ostensibly preclude insurance redlining or to prevent eco-
nomic disaster in the real estate market, it cannot be said that the 
moratorium legislation lacks a rational justification for enactment.152 
C. Contract Clause Challenges 
A viable Contract Clause153 claim requires insurance companies 
to make a sufficient showing that the contested moratorium legisla-
 
 149. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
 150. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 151. See Gallo v. U.S. District Court, 349 F.3d 1169, 1181 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is well-
established that rational basis scrutiny permits the court to consider any conceivable justifications 
for enacting the law.”). 
 152. See Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Florida, 141 F.3d 1427, 1430 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) (decid-
ing that the State of Florida did not lack a rational basis for passing moratorium legislation after 
Hurricane Andrew and summarily dismissing insurer’s Substantive Due Process claim with little 
discussion). But see People ex rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823, 829 (Sup. 
Ct. 1978) (finding that the statutory provision as applied to defendant insurers conscripted and 
compelled them to continue doing business at a loss in the state in violation of their due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 153. The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Contract 
Clause applies to state governments, not the federal government. See Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 n.9 (1984) (citing 5 J. Elliott, Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 546 (2d ed. 1876); 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, at 619 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911)) (“It could not justifiably be claimed that the Contract 
Clause applies, either by its own terms or by convincing historical evidence, to actions of the 
National Government.”). The Contract Clause limits state’s power to modify its own contracts 
as well as to regulate contracts between private parties. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 
431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (“It long has been established that the Contract Clause limits the power 
of the States to modify their own contracts as well as to regulate those between private parties.” 
(citing Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137–39 
(1810))). Not every modification of a contractual promise impairs an obligation of the contract 
sufficient to establish a violation of the Contract Clause. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 
U.S. 497, 507–08 (1965) (“For it is not every modification of a contractual promise that impairs 
the obligation of contract under federal law, any more than it is every alteration of existing rem-
edies that violates the Contract Clause.”). “Although the language of the Contract Clause is 
facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the 
State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people.’” Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & 
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
434 (1934)); see also Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 38–39 
(1940) (noting that all contracts are made subject to the paramount authority of the state to 
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tion substantially impaired its insurance contract with its insured. 
Central to this argument is the understanding that an insurance poli-
cy is a contract that provides coverage for a specified risk for a specified 
policy period (typically one year). At the end of the policy period, the 
insurance company reevaluates the risk and decides whether to re-
main subject to the risk or to cancel the policy. Under moratorium 
legislation, it can be argued that the legislation would likely force an 
insurance company to continue the contractual relationship that it 
could otherwise terminate pursuant to the contract terms. It can be 
argued that a forced continuation of a contract that normally would 
expire constitutes a substantial impairment of the insurance compa-
ny’s contractual rights. 
Once the insurance company establishes a substantial impairment 
of its contracts, the burden shifts to the state to establish a significant 
and legitimate public purpose behind the moratorium legislation. 
The state may be able to demonstrate a legitimate public purpose by 
precluding insurance redlining and by protecting and stabilizing the 
state’s economy, particularly the housing market.154 This public pur-
pose does not need to address an emergency or temporary situation 
in order to be valid.155 
The question that the court will have to answer is whether the 
 
regulate health, morals, and safety, as well as the economic needs of society). Courts consider 
three factors in evaluating any allegation of a breach of the Contract Clause: (1) whether the 
law substantially impairs a contractual relationship; (2) whether there is a significant and legiti-
mate public purpose for the law; and (3) whether the adjustments of rights and responsibilities 
of the contracting parties are based upon reasonable conditions and are of an appropriate na-
ture. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 410–13 (discussing the factors to be applied in a Con-
tract Clause analysis). 
“Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of substantial 
impairment.” Id. at 411; see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978) 
(“The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must 
clear.”); Campanelli v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The more 
severe the impairment, the more searching the examination of the legislation must be.”). In de-
termining the extent of the impairment, a court must decide whether the government has pre-
viously regulated the industry of the party asserting the Contract Clause claim. See Veix,  310 
U.S. at 38 (“When he purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to which 
he now objects, he purchased subject to further legislation upon the same topic.”); Hudson Wa-
ter Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) (“One whose rights, such as they are, are subject 
to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract 
about them.”). 
 154. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226–28 (1986). 
 155. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 412 (recognizing justifications that address 
broader social problems and not merely emergency situations although the state must offer a 
significant and legitimate purpose for the regulation). 
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
74 
moratorium legislation is animated by a legitimate purpose and then 
whether the state’s modification of the contract rights and responsi-
bilities are based upon reasonable conditions.156 “Unless the State it-
self is a contracting party[,] . . . courts properly defer to legislative 
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular meas-
ure.”157 
D. Equal Protection Clause Challenges 
Another possible constitutional objection is an Equal Protection 
Clause challenge. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”158 It can be argued that a moratorium com-
pels insurers doing business in a state with the moratorium to commit 
capital to that state and its resident policyholders while at the same 
time restrict the insurer’s available capital to underwrite insurance 
policies in other states. This has the effect of not only limiting insur-
ance, but also raising insurance premiums in other states, resulting in 
injury to non-residents who seek to purchase policies from carriers 
doing business in a state with a moratorium. Non-resident policy-
holders in other states may also be insured by a carrier whose health 
and solvency is jeopardized by the moratorium. It can be argued that 
the moratorium violates the Equal Protection Clause because it dis-
criminates against citizens of other states on the basis of their resi-
dency. 
The Equal Protection Clause is not violated merely because a 
state has made distinctions between groups; namely, the state treats 
different classes of persons in different ways.159 The Equal Protection 
Clause precludes states from classifying persons in a discriminatory 
fashion or placing individuals into different classes on the basis of cri-
teria wholly unrelated to the objective of the legislation.160 In the ar-
ea of economics and social welfare, a state can classify people differ-
ently so long as the classifications are rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose.161 The classification, however, cannot be arbitrary, re-
 
 156. Id. at 412–13 (discussing modification of contracts by states). 
 157. Id. 
 158. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 159. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 810–11 (1969); Ry. Express 
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
 160. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
 161. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
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fer to distinctions that affect any fundamental rights, or affect some 
suspect class of persons.162 Courts have held that classifications that 
merely distinguish between residents from nonresidents do not re-
quire application of the strict scrutiny test.163 Nevertheless, a state 
cannot favor its own residents based on the view that the state may 
take care of “its own.”164 
A similar argument was addressed by the district court of New 
Jersey in Ballesteros v. New Jersey Property Liability Insurance Guaranty 
Ass’n.165 In Ballesteros, Margarita Ballesteros was shot in the foot and 
injured while in La Vaca Loca Tavern in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The 
tavern was owned by Jose Gonzales and insured by the Long Island 
Insurance Company. During the term of the policy, the Long Island 
Insurance Company suffered severe financial difficulties and, ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court of the State of New York ordered the 
New York Superintendent of Insurance to take possession of the car-
rier’s assets and to rehabilitate the carrier. The order also terminated 
all policies issued by the carrier to policyholders outside of the State 
of New York. Acting under the authority granted by the order, the 
Superintendent of Insurance issued notices of cancellation, which 
terminated all policies embraced by the court order, including the 
policy issued to the tavern.166 
After the incident, Ms. Ballesteros sued the tavern for negligence 
and was awarded a default judgment. Ms. Ballesteros then sued the 
 
 162. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). 
 163. Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The utilization of dif-
ferent, but otherwise constitutionally adequate, procedures for residents and nonresidents does 
not, by itself, trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Ward v. 
Bd. of Exam’rs of Eng’rs, 409 F. Supp. 1258, 1259 (D.P.R. 1976), aff’d, 429 U.S. 801 (1977). If a 
classification involves invidious discrimination by either impermissibly interfering with a fun-
damental right or it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of an inherently suspect class, then a 
court utilizes the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the classification has been precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–217 
(1982); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312. 
 164. See Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (holding that the 
state cannot create two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans that identifies resident veterans who 
settled in the state after a certain date as “second-class citizens” by not providing tax exemptions 
for those veterans); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (holding that Alaskan statute using 
length of state residence to calculate distribution of dividends from the state’s oil reserves vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause). Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 449–50, & n.6 (1973) (hold-
ing that the state violates the Equal Protection Clause when it provides lower in-state tuition 
for established residents compared to new residents). 
 165. 530 F. Supp. 1367 (D.N.J. 1982). 
 166. Id. at 1369. 
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New Jersey Guaranty Association, claiming that the Association was 
liable on the claim against the tavern because its carrier, Long Island 
Insurance Company, was defunct. The Association denied liability 
and alleged that the policy was terminated by the New York court’s 
order of rehabilitation and that, therefore, the tavern did not have a 
“covered claim” against the insurer within the meaning of the New 
Jersey Property Liability Insurance Guaranty Act.167 
Ms. Ballesteros argued, among other things, that the New York 
court’s cancellation of all policies held by nonresidents of the state 
violated the equal protection rights of the insured. The district court 
rejected this assertion, noting that classifications distinguishing resi-
dents from nonresidents need only be rationally related. The district 
court held that the New York court, acting in the interests of the pol-
icyholders and the public, determined that in order to successfully 
rehabilitate the carrier, it was necessary to cancel the policies held by 
non-resident insureds.168 According to the district court, the New 
York court was attempting to restrict the carrier’s business and ease 
the costs of administration by requiring that the carrier do its busi-
ness locally. “Because the New York court’s order was a rational at-
tempt to reduce the [carrier’s] potential liabilities . . . and to reduce 
administrative expenses, [the district court held] that the equal pro-
tection rights of the insured were not violated.”169 
As previously discussed, states will likely have a rationally related 
basis for the imposition of a moratorium notwithstanding any adverse 
effects the moratorium may have on out-of-state residents. Conse-
quently, any equal protection clause challenge will likely not prevail. 
V. Federal Solutions to State Moratorium Protections 
The effects of a catastrophic hurricane loss threaten to reach out-
side the boundaries of the Gulf states and other states prone to hurri-
canes.170 The type of emergency moratorium utilized in Florida can 
cause significant multi-state market disruption. Both national and re-
gional insurance companies could be placed at financial risk because 
of a requirement that they maintain significant risk exposure to re-
 
 167. Id. at 1369–70. 
 168. Id. at 1372. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See  Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk: Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. & the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on H. Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 131 (2006). 
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current hurricane losses during the period of the moratorium. Given 
the magnitude of potential hurricane exposure, any Category 4 or 
Category 5 hurricane could tip the scales on insolvency with ripple 
effects in each state of operation of the national or regional insurance 
company. Insolvency risk would be unpredictably increased on a mul-
ti-state level. Multi-state insolvencies would deplete individual state’s 
property and casualty guarantee funds in order to make policyholders 
whole.171 Because reinsurers are subject to more limited government 
regulation, reinsurers may move to exclude hurricane risk without 
governmental approval. The withdrawal of reinsurers from the hurri-
cane market will leave primary insurers at risk of insolvency in the 
event of a major hurricane loss. 
What alternatives to state moratoriums are available for the man-
agement of mega-catastrophes that may be inflicted by a Category 4 
or Category 5 hurricane?172 Three principal alternatives exist. Under 
the first alternative, Congress can enact federal legislation prohibiting 
states from imposing moratoriums. This approach, however, does not 
resolve the fundamental issue because insurers will likely withdraw 
 
 171. See 26 John Alan Appleman, et al., Appleman on Insurance § 166.1 (2d ed. 
2006) (discussing the creation and maintenance of state guarantee associations in which money 
is pooled to put towards the paying of claims of insolvent insurers). All fifty states and Puerto 
Rico have enacted laws with which require the establishment of these associations. Id. In the 
1960s insolvencies of several property-liability insurance companies sparked an interest in regu-
lating insurance companies at the federal level. Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of Interna-
tional Norms for Insurance Regulation, 34 Brook. J. Int’l L. 953, 974 (2009). A federal insurance 
act was proposed which would have allowed insurers to seek either a federal or a state charter. 
Id.; see also Federal Insurance Act of 1977, S. 1710, 95th Cong. § 201 (1977). The federal insur-
ance act was not enacted. Brown, supra, at 974. “In 1969, the NAIC proposed model legislation 
for state guaranty funds. By 1982, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had 
adopted some form of state guarantee fund legislation . . . .” Id. There was renewed interest in 
the federal regulation of insurance in the 1980s and early 1990s due to several insurance com-
pany bankruptcies. See Jonathan R. Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13, 15 (1993). A re-
port of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce found, in 1990, that existing state regulations regarding insurance company sol-
vency were inadequate. Brown, supra , at 975. In response, a proposal creating a dual system of 
insurance company solvency regulation was proposed including the creation of a federal guar-
antee fund for federally chartered insurance companies. Id. This proposal failed. Thereafter 
many states adopted “risk-based capital requirements [for insurers similar to the banking re-
quirements], a financial regulation accreditation program, and an initiative to codify statutory 
accounting principles.” Id. 
 172. Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane. Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance 
After Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 
581, 595 (2006). In fact, in 2005 a record three hurricanes reached Category 5 status including 
Katrina. Id. at 595–96. 
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from hurricane-prone areas or substantially increase premiums, leav-
ing homeowners uninsured or underinsured. Under the second alter-
native, the federal government would become the reinsurer of last re-
sort for hurricane insurance, which would allow for a stable 
homeowner insurance marketplace in regions most vulnerable to hur-
ricanes. The second alternative does not address the market stability 
issues within the affected state but would prevent a ripple effect of 
potential insolvency, which the Florida model of emergency morato-
rium threatens. Under the third approach, the federal government 
would create an optional federal charter for insurance companies. For 
those insurance companies insuring business in hurricane-prone 
states, they could escape the reach of state moratorium legislation by 
becoming federally chartered. 
A. Federal Legislation Prohibiting State-Imposed Moratoriums 
As previously discussed, after the passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, states have jurisdiction over insurance regulation. Nev-
ertheless, Congress can enact federal legislation that completely 
preempts state insurance laws (such as Florida’s moratorium legisla-
tion), if the federal legislation specifically relates to the “business of 
insurance.”173 Thus, Congress can enact federal legislation that 
preempts states from imposing moratoriums and allow insurers to 
withdraw from states to avoid insolvency due to catastrophic hurri-
cane losses. If Congress enacted such legislation, then the likely result 
is that insurers would cease to write homeowners coverage in those 
states, leaving homeowners with two options: (1) purchasing more 
expensive insurance coverage, or (2) remaining uninsured.174 Such 
federal legislation may not fundamentally resolve the issues of en-
couraging homeownership in those areas.175 To accomplish such 
 
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994). See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 
(1992) (“The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and 
to pre-empt contrary state regulation.”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 759 (1982) (“Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the regulation 
of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in the regulation of transactions between such 
utilities and cogenerators.”). 
 174. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 175. The Hurricane Katrina and Rita Recovery Homesteading Act of 2005, S. 2008, 109th 
Cong. (2005), sought to assist in the rebuilding of neighborhoods in Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi that were damaged by Hurricane Katrina, by promoting homeownership opportuni-
ties by giving displaced low-income families the opportunity to purchase a home owned by the 
federal government. President George W. Bush was in favor of such an act in part because the 
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goals, the federal government can, alternatively, regulate the hurri-
cane insurance market. 
B. Marketplace Dysfunction Supports a Federal Insurance Program 
Managing the risk from catastrophic hurricanes presents a diffi-
cult challenge to the effective functioning of insurance markets.176 
The first challenge is one of diversification. Diversification is a fun-
damental premise of an effective insurance market relating to the 
ability of insurance companies to diversify risk through the law and 
large numbers.177 As an example, where the risk of being insured is 
the threat of loss of crops due to flood, diversification fails when the 
crops being insured are in the same floodplain. This is because all of 
the crops share a common element of, and thus high correlation of, 
risk.178 Thus, the concept of diversification works only when the risks 
being pooled are independent of each other.179 One commentator has 
even observed that this “lack of independence in the risks being 
pooled renders the risk-pooling arrangement useless.”180 Cata-
strophic hurricanes present a difficult challenge in the form of diver-
sification because “diversification is difficult or impossible because 
every member of a large population is likely to be affected adversely 
 
Gulf region has some of the most beautiful and historic places in America. President Bush Deliv-
ers Remarks on Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/15/AR2005091502252.html. 
However, the act never passed Congress. 
 176. A properly functioning insurance marketplace allocates risk and creates appropriate 
incentives for responsible behavior, creates opportunities for spreading economic consequences 
of loss, creates victim compensation and prevents over-deterrence. See generally, Maksim Rakh-
lin, Regulating Nanotechnology: A Private-Public Insurance Solution, 2008 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2, 
12 (2008). Four factors must exist for a properly functioning insurance market: (1) there must 
be accessibility (the probability and severity of losses must be quantifiable to allow pricing); (2) 
there must be sufficient randomness (time of the insured event must be unpredictable and oc-
currence independent of the will of the insured); (3) there must be mutuality (exposed persons 
must join together to build a community to share and diversity risk); and (4) there must be eco-
nomic feasibility (insurers must be able to charge a premium which is commensurate with the 
risk, giving them a fair chance to write the business profitably in the long term). Id. at 13. 
 177. Jerry & Roberts, supra note 48, at 843. 
 178. Id. at 843–44. 
 179. Id. There are three factors that make diversification of a hurricane risk portfolio dif-
ficult: (1) the probability and severity of risks are difficult if not impossible to assess; (2) many 
companies, industry sectors, and geographical regions are affected simultaneously; and (3) pre-
dicting the magnitude of a possible event exceeds the capacities of the private industry. 
 180. Id. at 844. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
80 
at the same time.”181 
A second problem for the creation of a hurricane-insurance mar-
ketplace is ambiguity. The concept of ambiguity has “multiple facets, 
with two of the principal ones being uncertainty of frequency and uncer-
tainty of consequence.”182 Traditionally, “[w]hen the frequency of a loss 
is uncertain, insurers are unlikely to insure it or will undertake to do 
so only for a very high premium.”183 The problem is that “the weight 
of scientific authority suggests that hurricane frequency is undergo-
ing a shift that will distinguish the next few from the past few dec-
ades.”184 So, the accumulated historical record on hurricane frequen-
cy does not give an accurate basis predicting future events. 
“Uncertainty of consequence is a related kind of ambiguity.”185 This 
type of ambiguity has a “wide range of potential consequence . . . de-
pend[ing up]on human behavior and is therefore inherently difficult 
to predict.”186 
Another problem may be the “lack of demand for coverage.”187 
One commentator has noted that there are three facets to this prob-
lem. First, “very few people voluntarily protect themselves against a 
hazard unless they have past experience with it or know someone else 
who has endured it.”188 Second, the demand for insurance can be 
suppressed by budgetary constraints as consumers turn away from in-
surance products because their lack of experience with the manifested 
risk makes the insurance product appear to have little value.189 Third, 
the “expectation of ex post government[al] disaster assistance may re-
duce the demand for coverage.”190 One explanation for “the lack of 
demand for catastrophic insurance coverage” focuses on the actions 
of “rational consumers [who] may well forgo purchasing insurance 
now because they expect” to receive government benefits—or “free 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 186. Id. at 845. 
 187. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 188. Id. & n.32 (citing Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural 
Disaster Insurance?, in On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina 178 
(Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. For a discussion of federal disaster assistance previously provided for natural dis-
asters, see supra notes 4–11. 
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insurance”—later through “government grants, loans, or other forms 
of post-disaster insurance.”191  
Whether the consuming public will ultimately decide to purchase 
hurricane insurance is problematic. California’s experience with 
earthquake insurance exemplifies the problem. In 2003, “[o]nly sev-
enteen percent of Californians ha[d] earthquake insurance. This fig-
ure [was] down from twenty-eight percent before the Northridge 
earthquake in 1994, primarily because of the very high premiums.”192 
To date, the federal government has not enacted a special provision 
for earthquake insurance.193 
The problem of demand became evident after the passage of the 
National Flood Insurance Act (NFIP).194 Congress was initially dis-
satisfied with the lack of commitment being made to the Program by 
the municipalities after its enactment. Therefore, Congress added ad-
ditional incentives for communities to participate in the Program. At 
that time, Congress was concerned because many communities had 
decided to remain outside the Program and avoid paying any insur-
ance premiums since they could collect federal disaster relief.195 
These incentives took the form of the Flood Disaster Protection Act 
of 1973.196 The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 required the 
purchase of flood insurance as a condition to receiving any form of 
federal or federally related financial assistance for the acquisition or 
construction of insurable buildings and mobile homes within a specif-
ic identified special flood, mudslide, or flood related erosion hazard 
area located within any community participating in the Program.197 
 
 191. Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood In-
surance, 26 Miss. C. L. Rev. 3, 10 & n.25 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing 
About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., 
Mar. 2006, at 171, 178). 
 192. Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 Yale L.J. 2509, 2518 n.46 (2003). 
 193. As it does with homes in earthquake zones or within an estimated geographical zone 
for hurricanes, the federal government could require homeowners seeking FHA financing to 
participate in a federal insurance program. 
 194. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was enacted by Title XIII of the Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1301–1377, 82 Stat. 476, 572–89 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)), to provide previously unavailable 
flood insurance protection to property owners in flood-prone areas. 
 195. United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 756 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 196. See Tex. Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D.D.C. 1978), 
aff’d, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 197. Id. at 1027–28; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4012(a). If flooding in a declared disaster area oc-
curs in a non-participating SFHA community, no federal financial assistance can be provided 
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The Flood Disaster Protection Act also required that any community 
containing one or more special flood hazards would receive no feder-
al financial assistance unless the community in which the area was lo-
cated was then participating in the NFIP. 
C. Creation of a Federal Hurricane Insurance Program 
In determining what potential natural catastrophes should be 
considered for federal intervention, the covered natural catastrophes 
should have basic features: (1) they occur frequently and unpredicta-
bly; and (2) they can impose huge costs when they do occur.198 Natu-
ral catastrophes cannot be anticipated in a true actuarial sense.199 But 
natural catastrophes generally follow proximate patterns while the in-
cidents of an occurrence has a significant degree of randomness in its 
timing and location.200 To some extent insurance companies can at-
tempt to estimate the threat of natural catastrophes through tools like 
hazard risk maps and historical estimates of the probability of an 
event’s occurrence and levels of compensation likely to result.201 But 
such probabilistic tools have limits.202 
A second compelling argument for government intervention in-
volves the liquidity concern facing the insurance and reinsurance 
marketplace in the event of future hurricane catastrophes. One com-
mentator opines that “only the federal government has the deep (and 
theoretically unlimited) pockets through its taxing power to endure 
 
for permanent repair or reconstruction of insurable buildings. See id. § 5172(a). If the communi-
ty applies and is accepted into the NFIP within six months of a presidential disaster declaration, 
the limitations on federal disaster assistance are lifted, however. See id. § 5172. This community 
option to retroactively opt in after a declared disaster creates a free-rider problem. 
 198. Manns, supra note 192, at 2516; see also Weimin Dong et al., A Rational Approach to 
Pricing of Catastrophe Insurance, 12 J. Risk & Uncertainty 201, 201 (1996). 
 199. Manns, supra note 192, at 2517; see also Dong et al., supra note 198, at 201. 
 200. Manns, supra note 192, at 2517. 
 201. Id. 
 202. One commentator has cogently described the landscape contexts: 
All risks are not the same. The combinations of source, frequency, severity, managea-
bility, predictability, and dependent variables are as unique as fingerprints. Past expe-
riences have ranged in scale from localized events to mega-catastrophes. Risks must 
not only be identified, they must be assessed for the purpose of prioritization . . . . 
When a risk is so infrequent as to make the extrapolation of any data inadequate, its 
assessment becomes difficult. Assessment is shaped by empirical data (if available) and 
judgment (particularly where data is insufficient). Perceptions of risk play a vital role. 
Faulty perceptions have led to failed assessments, and such failures have plagued 
many endeavors. 
Rhee, supra note 172, at 587–88 (citations omitted). 
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the financial shocks of the most severe catastrophic events.”203 As an 
example, with respect to the World Trade Center catastrophe the fed-
eral government granted the City of New York $20 billion on an 
emergency basis.204 
In addition to federal disaster relief, federal insurance programs 
are already available for certain types of catastrophic risks, including 
insurance for political risk associated with American private invest-
ment in developing countries,205 nuclear energy development,206 ri-
 
 203. Manns, supra note 192, at 2518. 
 204. See id. at 2519 (citing Carl Hulse, Congress at Ground Zero: The Special Assembly, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 7, 2002, at B1). 
 205. 22 U.S.C. § 2191–2200a (2000) (stating that political risk insurance is to facilitate 
private investment by U.S. businesses in developing countries). 
 206. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Damages Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 
(1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (stating that operators of nucle-
ar reactors are required to obtain insurance in the private market to the maximum amount 
available and capitalize a second insurance fund with implicit government financial backing for 
accidents in which damages exceed the combined limits of private insurance in the secondary 
fund). 
When Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it was contemplated that the fed-
eral government would have a monopoly on the development of nuclear power. Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 62 (1978); see also Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 
724, 60 Stat. 755. However, it was later determined by Congress that it was in the national in-
terest for the United States government to encourage the private sector to become involved in 
the peaceful development of nuclear energy under a program of federal regulation and licens-
ing. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 63; see also H.R. Rep. No. 83-2181, at 1–11 (1954). This policy 
was implemented by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 63; see Act of 
August 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 69 Stat. 909 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2281 (1970 
ed. & Supp. V). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided for licensing of private construction, 
ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear-power reactors under the supervision of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Elect. Workers, 367 U.S. 396 
(1961). In response to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, private industry formed a consortium of 
interested companies for the development of an experimental power plant. But it became ap-
parent that profits from the private-exploitation energy were uncertain and the accompanying 
risks were substantial. E.g., Harold P. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 
71 Mich. L. Rev. 479, 479–81 (1973). 
A major obstacle to the development of a private nuclear-power industry was the risk of 
potentially vast liability in the event of a nuclear accident of a sizable magnitude. Duke Power 
Co., 438 U.S. at 64. Although private industry and the Atomic Energy Commission were confi-
dent that such a disaster would not occur, the very uniqueness of nuclear power meant that the 
possibility remained and the potential liability exceeded the ability of the industry and private 
insurance companies to absorb the risk. Id; see Hearings on Government Indemnification for Private 
Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards Before the J. Comm. on Atomic Energy,  84th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 122–24 (1956) [hereinafter Hearings on Government Indemnification]. The indus-
try advised Congress that it would be forced to withdraw from the development of peaceful nu-
clear energy if the industry’s liability were not limited by appropriate legislation. Duke Power 
Co., 438 U.S. at 64; see Hearings on Government Indemnification. Congress addressed this concern 
with the passage of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 
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ots and civil disorders,207 crop failure,208 and terrorism.209 But one 
 
U.S.C. § 2210). The Act had the dual purpose of “protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] 
the development of the atomic energy industry.” 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i). The original form of the 
Act limited the aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident to $500 million plus the amount 
of liability insurance available on the private market. David F. Cavers, Improving Financial Protec-
tion of the Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 644, 646 (1965). The Act 
required the nuclear facility to purchase the maximum available amount of privately underwrit-
ten public-liability insurance. Id. Under the Act, if damages from a nuclear disaster exceeded the 
amount of the private insurance coverage, the federal government would indemnify the licensee 
in an amount not to exceed $500 million. Id. Thus, the actual ceiling on liability was the amount 
of the government’s indemnification obligation of $500 million plus the amount of private in-
surance coverage available. Id. 
 207. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 476 
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 31, 38, 40, 42 & 49 U.S.C.). 
 208. Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act, Title V of the Agricultural Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 72 (1938). The purpose of the Act was to improve the eco-
nomic stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop insurance. Id. § 502. The Act cre-
ated the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. Id. § 503. The Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion was empowered to insure or to provide reinsurance for insurance companies who in turn 
insured producers of agricultural commodities grown in the United States based upon sufficient 
actuarial data. Id. § 508. Crop insurance under the program provides insurance for crop losses 
due to draught, flood or other natural disasters as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Id. § 508(a). The insurance also provides catastrophic risk protection where producers are in-
demnified for crop loss due to a loss of yield or when they have been prevented from planting 
because of drought, flood or other natural disasters. Id. 
 209. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insur-
ance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), Pub. L. No. 107–297 § 101(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323 (2002). 
TRIA was enacted to “protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the con-
tinued widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism 
risk.” Id. The Act established a terrorism insurance program which was initially a temporary 
program. Id. §§ 102(10), 108(a). Under TRIA, the federal government acted as a reinsurer for a 
three-year period for acts of foreign terrorism where property and casualty insurance losses 
from an act of terrorism exceed a threshold amount. See id. §§ 101(a)(6), 102(1)(B)(ii). Participa-
tion in TRIA is mandatory for those entities meeting the definition of an insurer who must 
make terrorism coverage available. Id. §§ 103(a)(3), 102(6), 103(c)(1)(A). Under TRIA, the fed-
eral government is responsible for 90% of the portion of insured losses that exceed the insurer’s 
deductible that must be paid during each year of the program. Id. § 103(e)(1)(A). Importantly, 
TRIA declares as void terrorism exclusions in property and casualty insurance contracts for par-
ticipating members. Id. § 105(a)–(b). 
Some critics have argued that government intervention was unnecessary because the in-
surance marketplace would have eventually found a solution for the problem. See Anne Gron & 
Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 Ind. L. 
Rev. 447, 448–49 (2003). Commentators have discussed cogent reasons why policyholders may 
decide not to purchase terrorism insurance coverage under TRIA: (1) the high cost of terrorism 
coverage; (2) the limited scope of the coverage purchased; (3) the lack of belief that terrorism 
will strike their business or property; and (4) in the hope that the government will step in and 
pay resulting losses through a relief program. See also John P. Dearie & Laurie A. Kamaiko, Ter-
rorism Risk Statute, Nat’l L.J., July 21, 2003, at 17. 
One commentator has observed that “[g]overnment insurance programs have historically 
had adverse economic effects. They have ‘crowded out’ the private sector with infeasible pric-
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commentator has observed that “government insurance programs 
have historically had adverse economic effects. They have “crowded 
out” the private sector with infeasible pricing, “anesthetized” market 
innovations, and “created moral hazards.”210 Nevertheless, the les-
sons learned from enacting federal insurance programs for floods can 
be utilized in enacting federal insurance for hurricanes. The article 
next discusses the rationale for enacting a federal insurance plan for 
floods and the rationale for a proposed federal insurance program for 
hurricanes. 
1. Federal insurance for floods 
As a result of catastrophic flooding which occurred along the 
Mississippi River in 1927, the private insurance industry abandoned 
the market for flood insurance.211 The catastrophic flooding jeopard-
ized the solvency of many property insurers.212 The industry’s aver-
sion to flood risk stemmed from a variety of factors, including: 
“[p]oor, [i]nadequate, and [i]naccurate [i]nformation [a]bout [f]lood 
[r]isks;”213 “[r]isk [c]orrelation;”214 and “[a]dverse [s]election.”215 Re-
 
ing, ‘anesthetized’ market innovations, and created moral hazards.” Rhee, supra note 172, at 600. 
See also Gron & Sykes, supra note 209. 
Although TRIA was written to sunset on December 31, 2005, Congress extended the 
sunset to December 31, 2007 under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 
(TRIEA), Pub. L. No. 109-144, § 2(a), 119 Stat. 2660 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6781 
(2005)). Although most of the terms and provisions of TRIEA are substantially the same as 
those of TRIA, there are significant differences. First, TRIEA increases the insurer deductible. 
Id. § 3(c)(3)(E) & (F). TRIEA reduced the proportion of federal payment in 2007. Although the 
federal government is still required to pay 90% of insured losses in excess of the insurer deduct-
ible in 2006, that amount was reduced to 85% in 2007. Id. § 4(1)(B). TRIEA also increases the 
recoupment amount so that the insurers are required to pay a higher amount back to the federal 
government. TRIEA § 5. Whereas the TRIA program would take effect for all acts of terrorism 
that resulted in $5 million of insured loss, TRIEA sharply increased the program trigger to $50 
million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007. Id. § 6. 
Critics see TRIEA as a form of corporate welfare and that the insurance industry should 
not be given this extra support. See Richard R. Stedman II, Of Hurricanes and Airplanes: The Con-
gressional Knee-Jerk Reaction to September 11, 49 Loy. L. Rev. 997, 1020 (2003). If left to their 
own devices, insurance companies will exclude hurricane coverage in various forms from their 
policies. 
 210. Rhee, supra note 172, at 600. See generally Gron & Sykes, supra note 209. 
 211. John K. DiMugno, Steven Plitt & Dennis J. Wall, CAT Claims: Insurance Coverage for 
Natural and Man-Made Disasters § 13:6 (West 2012) (Daniel Maldonado, contributing author). 
 212. Id. at 13-10 to 13-11. 
 213. Id.; see Scales, supra note 191, at 8. 
 214. DiMugno et al., supra note 211; Scales, supra note 191, at 9–10. 
 215. DiMugno et al., supra note 211; Scales, supra note 191, at 8–9. 
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garding risk correlation, insurance companies assume a variety of 
risks within an insurance program which, in turn, lowers the likeli-
hood that all of its customers will file a claim in the same year. Thus, 
the ability to pool a variety of risks is a bedrock feature of a successful 
insurance system.216 But where the risks are correlated, the beneficial 
effects of pooling of risks decreases because each insured is more like-
ly to experience the risk due to the same harmful event.217 Most cas-
ualty losses are uncorrelated. But flooding tends to be highly corre-
lated within a geographical area or areas.218 Regarding adverse 
selection, flood insurance presented a vexing problem whereby the 
people most likely to buy the insurance against flood losses were also 
the people most likely to suffer that type of loss.219 This can create 
what has commonly been called a “death spiral” where the unfortu-
nate risk pool begins to attract riskier insureds and deters good risks. 
The former is getting a good deal and the latter is overpaying.220 
Eventually, this type of “death spiral” will collapse the risk pool be-
cause of the inevitable rise in premiums which, in turn, reshapes the 
pool into an increasingly narrower band of highly risky consumers 
who can no longer afford an actuarially correct premium.221 
Congress intervened in 1968 with the enactment of the National 
Flood Insurance Act (NFIA).222 It was Congress’s belief that a flood 
insurance program with the “large-scale participation of the Federal 
Government and carried out to the maximum extent practicable by 
the private insurance industry [was] feasible and [could] be initiat-
ed.”223 The NFIA was the federal government’s answer to market 
failure in flood insurance224 and filled the vacuum left by insurance 
 
 216. DiMugno et al., supra note 211. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.; Scales, supra note 191, at 8–9. 
 221. DiMugno et al., supra note 211, at 13-11 to 13-12; Scales, supra note 191, at 9. 
 222. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 592 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2012)). 
 223. Id. § 4001(b)(2). 
 224. Scales, supra note 191, at 7. One commentator observed the following:  
Market failure may be defined as a condition in which economically rational transac-
tions do not take place. Flood insurance, like any casualty, is not inherently uninsur-
able. However, it suffers from unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that 
make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have responded rationally 
by avoiding it. 
Id. 
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companies leaving the marketplace.225 In passing NFIA, Congress 
found that “many factors have made it uneconomic for the private in-
surance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in 
need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions . . . .”226 
Congress hoped that the NFIA would “provide flexibility . . . so 
that . . . flood insurance may be based on workable methods of pool-
ing risks, minimizing costs, and distributing burdens equitably among 
those who will be protected by flood insurance and the general public.”227 
The flood insurance program is administered with cooperation 
between the federal government and private insurance companies; 
the private companies carry some of the risk, although the federal 
government stands ready to reinsure and reimburse excessive loss-
es.228 The program also requires ongoing actuarial studies to help set 
the premiums to be charged.229 The eventual goal of the program is 
to discourage building in flood prone areas by raising, over time, the 
premiums actually charged to equal the actuarial cost of flood insur-
ance.230 Although the program offers subsidized flood insurance, it is 
designed to operate much like any private insurance company and to 
eventually eliminate the subsidy. Because the program’s exposure to 
claims and its premiums must be estimated according to standard in-
surance practices, and because private insurers carry part of the risk, 
Congress clearly did not intend to abrogate standard insurance-law 
principles that affect such estimates and risks. 
One commentator has observed that the Federal Flood Insurance 
Program is a “welfare distribution scheme cloaked in insurance 
terms.”231 In essence, the source of funding is the same as ex post dis-
aster relief which is paid by the taxpayer.232 If hurricane catastrophes 
are funded by general revenue, at least the tax structure could be used 
to collect a catastrophe pool. This “catastrophe tax” could be struc-
tured progressively, allowing for the risks associated with the geo-
 
 225. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b)(1). The Standard Flood Insurance Policy issued under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4013(a) is found at 44 C.F.R. § 61, app. A(1) (2012). Significant terms used in the Standard 
Policy are defined at 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(4); see Gary Knapp, Annotation, National Flood Insurance Risks and 
Coverage, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 416 (1987). 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. §§ 4017, 4041–54. 
 229. Id. § 4014. 
 230. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 91 (1968). 
 231. Rhee, supra note 172, at 611. 
 232. Id. 
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graphic region and property value.233 
This approach would not be insurance in its traditional sense in 
that the tax would be based upon individual actuarial risk. Rather, it 
would mirror a pooling arrangement.234 
2. Federal insurance for hurricanes 
Some western countries have adopted government-backed pro-
grams that provide insurance against natural disasters.235 Congress 
considered establishing a federal program of reinsurance that would 
financially backup state natural catastrophe insurance programs and a 
bill was submitted in the House of Representatives known as the 
“Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2007.”236 The purpose of 
the proposed legislation was “[t]o establish a program to provide re-
insurance for State natural catastrophe insurance programs to help 
the United States better prepare for and protect its citizens against 
the ravages of natural catastrophes, to encourage and promote miti-
gation and prevention for, and recovery and rebuilding from such ca-
tastrophes, and to better assist in the financial recovery from such ca-
tastrophes.”237 Section two of the proposed legislation contains 
congressional findings: 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the United States needs to take actions to be better prepared 
for and better protected from catastrophes; 
(2) the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 are startling re-
minders of both the human and economic devastation that hur-
ricanes, flooding, and other natural disasters can cause; 
(3) if a hurricane similar to the deadly 1900 Galveston hurri-
cane occurred again it could cause over $36,000,000,000 in loss; 
(4) if the 1904 San Francisco earthquake occurred again it could 
cause over $400,000,000,000 in loss; 
 
 233. Id. at 612. 
 234. Id. at 617. 
 235. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reinsurance for Disasters 49 (2002), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/37xx/doc3787/09-20-federalreinsurance 
.pdf. For example, both Japan and New Zealand have earthquake reinsurance programs. Id. at 
49, 51. 
 236. H.R. 91, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 237. Id. at 1. 
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(5) if a Category 5 hurricane were to hit Miami it could cause 
over $50,000,000,000 in loss and devastate the insurance indus-
try in the United States; 
(6) if the 1938 ‘Long Island Express’ were to occur again it 
could cause over $30,000,000,000 in damage and if a hurricane 
that strong were to directly hit Manhattan it could cause over 
$150,000,000,000 in damage and cause irreparable harm to our 
Nation’s economy; 
. . . . 
(8) using history as a guide, natural catastrophes will inevitably 
place a tremendous strain on homeowners’ insurance markets 
in many areas, will raise costs for consumers, and will jeopard-
ize the ability of many consumers to adequately insure their 
homes and possessions; 
(9) the lack of sufficient insurance capacity and the inability of 
private insurers to build enough capital, in a short amount of 
time, threatens to increase the number of uninsured homeown-
ers, which, in turn, increases the risk of mortgage defaults and 
the strain on the Nation’s banking system[.]238 
The proposed legislation acknowledged that some states had to 
intervene to insure the continued availability and affordability of 
homeowners’ insurance to its state residents and that efforts to im-
prove insurance availability be implemented at the state level.239 Pri-
vate sector insurers and many state insurance entities seek to limit ex-
posure to large losses by transferring a portion of this risk to 
reinsurers and sometimes to the capital markets through insurance-
linked securities, known as catastrophe bonds.240 Other state entities 
do not use reinsurance or insurance-linked securities to protect 
against catastrophic losses. These States instead utilize post-event 
funding mechanisms, including assessments on primary insurers, pro-
ceeds from general revenue, and bonds.241 
The proposed legislation recognized that “while state insurance 
programs may be adequate to cover losses [for] most natural disasters, 
a small percentage of events are likely to exceed the financial capacity 
 
 238. Id. at 2–4. 
 239. Id. at 4. 
 240. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-568R, Natural Catastrophe In-
surance Coverage Remains a Challenge for State Programs 1–2 (2010). 
 241. Id. 
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of [those] programs and the local insurance markets.”242 Moreover, 
“participation in the reinsurance markets is expensive and results in 
high premium rates for policyholders, who may therefore decide not 
to purchase coverage,” but instead utilize post-funding mecha-
nisms.243 Because post-event funding concentrates all of the risk 
within the State rather than the broader private market, major natural 
catastrophes put State finances at risk. Congressional legislative pro-
posals have sought “to either facilitate the transfer of risk from state 
programs to the broader reinsurance and capital markets or to shift a 
portion of natural catastrophe risk from the [S]tates to the federal 
government.”244 
The proposed Act “encourage[d] States to create catastrophic 
funds by providing a federal backstop for those States that voluntarily 
create state funds.”245 The federal fund was to be named the Con-
sumer Hurricane and Earthquake Protection (HELP) Fund and 
would provide lower-cost reinsurance to state catastrophic funds.246 
Each contract of reinsurance coverage made available under the Act 
was to cover losses insured or reinsured by eligible state programs 
caused by: 
(1) earthquakes; 
(2) perils ensuing from earthquakes, including fire and tsunamis; 
(3) tropical cyclones having maximum sustained winds of at least 74 
miles per hour, including hurricanes and typhoons; 
(4) tornadoes; 
(5) volcanic eruptions; 
(6) catastrophic winter storms; and 
(7) any other natural catastrophe (not including any flood) insured 
or reinsured under the eligible State program for which reinsurance 
coverage . . . is provided.247 
Additionally, the proposed legislation provided for a general ac-
 
 242. H.R. 91, 110th Cong. § 2(12) (2007). 
 243. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 240, at 2. 
 244. Id. 
 245. House Reps. Introduce National Catastrophe Insurance Proposal, Ins. J. (Jan. 5, 2007), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/01/05/75650.htm. 
 246. Id. 
 247. H.R. 91 § 6. 
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counting office study of hurricane-related flooding, including the 
possibility of expanding the NFIP.248 The proposed federal reinsur-
ance program was referred to the House Committee on Financial 
Services on January 4, 2007, and has not been heard from since. It 
died in committee.  
 There are at least four identified public policy goals for federal 
government involvement in natural catastrophe insurance. These 
goals include: (1) charging premium rates that reflect the risk of loss, 
(2) encouraging broad participation, (3) encouraging the private mar-
ket to provide natural catastrophe insurance, and (4) limiting costs to 
U.S. taxpayers.249 
Before the devastating 2011 hurricane season, on July 22, 2010, 
the House considered H.R. 1264, the Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 
2009, which would add multi-peril coverage, including optional 
windstorm coverage, to the NFIP.250 The bill defines windstorm as 
“any hurricane, tornado, cyclone, typhoon, or other wind event.”251 
Windstorm coverage would only be available if the structure (and the 
personal property related thereto) was also covered by flood insur-
ance.252 The Senate never considered the bill, but President Obama 
had informed Congress that he was opposed to such legislation.253 
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Whether Congress or the President have reconsidered their position 
on federal hurricane insurance programs is currently unknown. 
D. Federal Charter 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse preemptive effect on fed-
eral regulation has been the regulatory paradigm that has prevailed 
for the last six decades. Recently there have been efforts to modify 
the federal-state demarcation, but none of these efforts have succeed-
ed.254 As an example, in the 1990s insurance brokers and insurance 
companies insuring large commercial risks urged Congress to enact a 
federal regulatory system with the goal of reducing “the alleged inef-
ficiencies inherent in dealing with the rules and regulations of fifty 
different states.”255 Concerned with the possible success of these ef-
forts, states responded by becoming more receptive to rate deregula-
tion in commercial markets and in so doing mooted the necessity of 
establishing a federal regulatory presence.256 In 2001, the American 
Insurance Association (AIA), an organization representing approxi-
mately 300 property and casualty insurance companies, “proposed 
that insurers be granted the option of obtaining a charter from a fed-
eral licensing agency in lieu of being regulated in each state in which 
they do business.”257 Because of the history of states’ regulation of 
the insurance industry as discussed in Parts III(B) and (C), supra, 
there are significant critiques of a federal charter.258 
Federal charter legislation was introduced in the United States 
Senate as part of the National Insurance Act of 2006.259 The purpose 
of the proposed Act was: 
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To authorize the issuance of charters and licenses for carrying on 
the sale, solicitation, negotiation, and underwriting of insurance or 
any other insurance operations, to provide a comprehensive system 
for the regulation and supervision of [n]ational [i]nsurers and 
[n]ational [a]gencies, [and] to provide for policyholder protections 
in the event of an insolvency or impairment of a [n]ational 
[i]nsurer.260  
The proposed Act would designate a commissioner of national 
insurance.261 Significant to this discussion is Section 1125, which 
provides that national insurers “shall not be subject to any form” of 
state regulation regarding the underwriting of insurance262 or any 
other insurance operations.263 
The U.S. Treasury Department issued a blueprint for a stronger 
regulatory structure, including recommendations for federal regula-
tion of insurance, on March 31, 2008.264 The blueprint recommends 
that Congress authorize an Optional Federal Charter (OFC), which 
would be issued by a newly established Office of National Insurance 
(ONI).265 
Optional federal insurance charter legislation was introduced into 
Congress on April 2, 2009.266 Under the proposed Act, “the ONI 
would regulate national insurers, national insurance agencies, federal-
ly licensed producers, and reinsurers.”267 ONI regulations would 
preempt state laws for ONI regulated entities with regard to licens-
ing, examinations, reporting, and regulations concerning the sale or 
underwriting of insurance, but would not preempt state laws govern-
ing property, taxes, workers’ compensation or motor vehicle insur-
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ance.268 
The advantages and disadvantages that an insurance company 
may receive through a federal charter vis-à-vis state licensure will not 
be discussed herein. The structure of the federal department of insur-
ance and the powers of the national commissioner of insurance over 
federally chartered insurance companies is also not discussed herein. 
What is relevant is that, arguably, if Congress adopts a federal charter, 
federally chartered insurance companies would most likely not be 
governed by state moratorium laws. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is unlikely that an insurance company can successfully chal-
lenge emergency non-cancellation moratoriums enacted after cata-
strophic hurricanes in the Gulf states. First, the forum in which the 
insurance companies will challenge the moratorium laws is state 
court. This is because the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity will 
bar insurance companies from suing the states’ departments of insur-
ance in federal court. Second, it is unlikely that constitutional chal-
lenges will be successful based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Contracts Clause. The demographics of 
the Gulf states most vulnerable to hurricane loss raise a concern that 
large cancellations in the residential homeowner marketplace will 
produce de facto redlining. The prohibition of redlining is an appro-
priate state action that provides support for the moratorium regula-
tion and significantly undercuts any constitutional challenge due to 
the presence of a legitimate, regulatable state interest. 
State-imposed regulatory non-cancellation moratoriums poten-
tially jeopardize the solvency of affected insurance companies in the 
Gulf states and other states prone to hurricanes. The policyholders of 
the affected insurance companies who reside in non-hurricane prone 
States have a substantial interest in those insurance companies’ sol-
vency. If a national or regional insurer becomes insolvent because of 
another hurricane, all policyholders will be affected beyond the 
boundaries of the regulating state. State guaranty funds will be 
stressed from any large insolvency. An even-handed approach would 
be to create a new federal catastrophe insurance program. There is 
significant precedent for such a program. Federal insurance programs 
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work well as social tools to protect against catastrophic events. 
Marketplace dysfunction supports the creation of a federal catas-
trophe insurance program. The concept of risk diversification does 
not exist when the risk is from a hurricane because every member of 
the community is likely to be effected adversely at the same time. On-
ly the federal government, through its taxing power, can endure the 
financial shock of severe catastrophic events. 
A federal catastrophe insurance program that would cover all ma-
jor disasters could be funded through premiums generated from each 
mortgage loan approved by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA). As further incentive to participate in the program, Congress 
could require participation in the national catastrophe insurance pro-
gram as a condition for receiving any governmental disaster assis-
tance. Private non-FHA lenders would most likely require participa-
tion in the national catastrophe insurance program as a condition of 
homeowner loan approval. Adoption of a national catastrophe insur-
ance program would potentially eliminate the need for state non-
cancellation moratoriums because the subsidized homeowner’s insur-
ance offering would allow affected insurance companies to avoid po-
tentially crippling exposures, such as those recently realized with 
Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Irene. Indirectly, a national catas-
trophe insurance program would also fairly protect all citizens 
throughout the United States against the action of a single state regu-
latory body that acts only for the benefit of its own citizens to the po-
tential detriment of non-residents. A federal insurance program 
would also require those citizens who live in a hurricane-prone area 
to fairly contribute and, at the same time, reduce the amount of fi-
nancial subsidies by those citizens who do not reside in a hurricane-
prone area. 
Utilization of a federal charter would not address the financial 
losses that are caused by a hurricane, but a federal charter would 
permit federally chartered insurance companies from withdrawing 
from any hurricane-prone marketplace. A federally chartered insur-
ance company would not be subject to the regulatory limitations that 
a state might impose in the form of a non-cancellation moratorium. 
Thus, federally chartered insurance companies would be free to 
withdraw from hurricane-prone states or be permitted, as federally 
chartered insurers, to include relevant policy exclusions to protect 
against the exposures arising from hurricane activity. The result, 
however, is that there may be less private insurance available for resi-
dents in hurricane-prone states and, therefore, more reliance on fed-
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eral ex post government disaster assistance for future natural disas-
ters. 
The authors call for the creation of a new federal catastrophe in-
surance program. The program can be funded through charges gen-
erated from FHA loans. Private lenders should be encouraged to re-
quire participation in the federal program as a condition of loan 
issuance. State protectionism in the form of regulatory non-
cancellation moratoriums should not be permitted because they 
threaten a broad base of policyholders outside the regulating state, 
which threatens the peace and security of those policyholders. 
 
